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PERSONAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
KAZUAKI SONO* and WARREN L. SHAT CK**
It is our purpose to compare Japanese and United States law and
practice in the area of personal property security.' Since it is not pos-
sible to find a precise common terminology for different types of secu-
rity transactions,2 it seems desirable to arrange the discussion in terms
of possessory and non-possessory security, and to use as subheads in the
latter category the names of the American security devices. Security
transfers of intangibles, chattel paper,' and title documents4 are dis-
cussed under the possessory-security classification. An appendix in-
cludes English translations of cited Japanese statutes and pertinent
Civil and Commercial Code as well as forms typical of those currently
used in Japan.
A few preliminary observations may be helpful. In a comparative
study of this kind all concerned are obliged to recognize and adjust to
some fundamental differences in approach. The Japanese start their
security-transaction analysis and research with a Code or a special sta-
* Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Washington; Lecturer,
Faculty of Law, Kansai University; Fulbright Scholar, Yale Law School, 1961-62.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.
"Personal property" is a term which in this context encompasses both chattels
and intangibles (in the American usage) and movables and obligations (in the
Japanese usage). "Obligation" is used here, in reference to Japanese law, in its
broadest sense. The exact margins of this category are disputed by Japanese scholars.
2 For the American lawyer the terms "chattel mortgage," "conditional sale," "trust
receipt," "factor's lien," and "pledge" evoke mental pictures of well-defined types of
transactions. These terms do not have exact counterparts in Japan. There the key
words are "do3san teit3,'" "-uriwatashi teit5," "joto tampo;' "torasuto reshiito," and
"shichiken." The transactions to which these terms are related will be described in
the discussion below. In American states in which the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as U.C.C.] is effective, the old terms continue to be used
although the statute provides for a sui generis "security interest." U.C.C. §§ 1-201
(37), 9-101 (Comment), 9-102. Such an interest exists when certain criteria are met.
U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204. The statute covers regardless of the form of the transaction,
i.e., whether or not cast in the traditional language of chattel mortgage, conditional
sale, pledge agreement, or trust receipt. U.C.C. §§ 9-102 (1) (a), (2).
3 This is a U.C.C. term, defined: "'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings
which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of
specific goods. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement
or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken
together constitutes chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (b). In common-law termi-
nology the transactions concerned are security assignments of conditional sale contracts
and security transfers of notes secured by pledges or mortgages.
4 Bills of lading and warehouse receipts are covered by this term. The U.C.C. uses
the single word "document" in § 9-105 (1) (e) to describe the types of arrangement
which are defined in § 1-201 (15) ("document of title") as including not only bills of
lading and warehouse receipts but also dock warrants and some analogous transactions.
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tute' which often does not disclose clear-cut answers. Relatively few
appellate decisions are reported and until recently it was difficult for
a researcher to locate specific cases in point because there was no one
publication which undertook to organize all of the cases topically.6
Moreover, there is no doctrine of precedent in Japan which accords
conclusive effect as law to decided cases.
Theoretically, a Japanese court is never bound to follow its own prior
decision and a lower court should resort to basic statutory principles
rather than to appellate decisions. The practice is not altogether in
conformity with the theory. Decisions are employed by counsel in the
argument of litigation, not as obligatory authority but as persuasive
to the extent that they involve analogous facts, are logical in reasoning,
and reach fair results. Such use of case material is possible only if the
opinion contains an adequate statement of the court's reasoning. Opin-
ions of this kind, more closely resembling the product of Anglo-Amer-
ican appellate courts than is true in some civil law jurisdictions, have
become typical in Japan.
Other important practical elements are an appellate judge's natural
desire for at least the appearance of consistency and a trial judge's
reluctance to invite reversal. Experience demonstrates that a position
once taken by the Supreme Court is apt to be maintained by the bench
5 In the transactions discussed in this article, the critical Japanese legislative
material will be the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, or one of the special statutes
later discussed. Concerning the interrelation between Codes which are deemed
"general" legislation, and statutes which are deemed "special" legislation, see Michida,
The Legal Structure for Economic Enterprise: Some Aspects of Japanese Comn-
mercial Law in LAw IN JAPAN 507-12 (von Mehren ed. 1963).G The official reports contain but a few of the decisions. The Supreme Court
designates the opinions which are to be printed in these reports and has been selecting
less than 10% of its decisions, less than .5% of the High Court (intermediate appeals)
decisions, and less than .3% of the District Court (nisi prius) decisions. Several
unofficial case-reporting publications have been started during the past several years.
These are commercial in purpose and reflect the increasing use of decisions by Japan-
ese lawyers. Some opinions not covered in the official reports are included. Of especial
interest is Soao HANREI KENKYU SosHo, a publication started in 1956 which resembles
the American Law Reports Annotated. It also includes summaries of scholars' opinions
on some points. It now covers the major sectors of Japanese law and is expected in
time to become comprehensive.
There is no dearth of litigation in Japan. District Court civil cases are being filed
at an annual rate in excess of 70,000; the population now totals about 95,000,000.
High Courts decide more than 10,000 civil cases each year. Supreme Court decisions
in civil matters number about 1,800 annually. These figures are a projection of those
which appear in Supreme Court of Japan, Outline of Japanese Judicial System (1961),
and in Supreme Court of Japan, ShOwa sanjarokunendo mnmii jiken no gaikya (Gen-
eral situation of civil cases in 1961), 14 Hoso JiHo ("Lawyers Association Journal")(No. 12) 47 (1962). In the United States, which has a population of roughly
190,000,000, reported appellate and federal district court decisions (civil and criminal)
are appearing at an annual rate of about 25,000. POLLACi, FuNDMAMENTALS OF LEaL
RIsEARcH 73 (2nd ed. 1962).
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which took it and that a lower court will not often hold at variance
with an appellate court in its line of appeal. Appeals from the High
Court to the Supreme Court are restricted by the Code of Civil Proce-
dure article 394 to instances of material error in applying "laws or
ordinances," and the latter terms are not deemed to encompass devia-
tions from case precedents. The practice, however, is better indicated
in a Supreme Court rule, i.e., Regulations of Civil Procedure (Minji
soshJ kisoku) article 48, which in part requires an appellant who
"alleges that the judgment contravenes judicial precedents established
by the Supreme Court" to designate specifically such precedents.
Decisions are evidently serving in Japan a function which is at var-
iance with the traditional scholarly stress on the theoretic absence of a
doctrine of precedent. The point seems to have been reached at which
disregard by the Supreme Court of a prior case in point is not mate-
rially more expectable than is such disregard or overruling by an Amer-
ican appellate court. Changes in judicial personnel do introduce an
element of doubt, but this is true as well in jurisdictions which adhere
to the doctrine of stare decisis. A notable by-product of the trend (and
part of its cause, too) is the increasing use of case material by modern
Japanese law teachers.
These encroachments on the idea that decisions are not binding prec-
edent must not be overemphasized. The dearth of reported cases often
leaves both counsel and teacher with no case in point, and in any
situation the Codes and the special statutes which supplement them
are the dominant factors.
This is not an environment in which to expect the development of a
cohesive body of case law. Yet, such a development has occurred in
the evolution of the security device discussed below as "j6to tampo."
The legal principles which sustain jito tampo are primarily derived
from decisions sufficient in number and consistency to justify a strong
belief in the likelihood of similar judicial results in the future. Usage
during half a century provides further assurance. On some points
scholars are supplying helpful refinements. Although it would not be
proper to label this as an area of Japanese "common law," the process
by which j6to tampo has become a useful economic tool resembles the
emergence of an Anglo-American common law principle.
The Japanese system has created a context in which scholarly dis-
cussions concerning the meaning of ambiguous or ambivalent Code
articles, the application of generally phrased Code provisions to partic-
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ular problems, the construction of statutes, and the evaluation of judi-
cial decisions have become especially valuable. Such discussions are
relied on by counsel in their analysis of clients' problems, in drafting,
and in arguments to courts. References to the "weight of scholarly
opinion" (tasfisetsu) or, most telling, to the "consensus of scholarly
opinion," (tsfisetsu) are both appropriate and routine, and scholars
are called to testify as expert witnesses concerning the meaning or
application of Code passages. Needless to say, on many points the
opinions of scholars differ, and the skill and reputation of a particular
writer can be an important factor in the planning of a business transac-
tion or in a court's decision. It is not intended to suggest that a fa-
vorable text passage, however scholarly, is an assurance of victory in
litigation. Judges feel strongly their responsibility for sound results
and may be expected to formulate independent answers for the prob-
lem before them.
Japan is, politically and legally, a single unit. Its commercial law
is grounded on Codes and special statutes which are nationwide in
operation. Its Supreme Court routinely handles appeals in commercial
litigation originating anywhere in Japan. In marked contrast with the
United States, the Japanese law which governs security transactions
is truly a "national" law. If there be doubt about the applicable legal
principle, it will be the product of unclear or inconclusive legislation,
lack of assurance about the strength of prior reported decisions (if
any), or the inability of scholars to agree, rather than of difficulty in
resolving internal choice-of-law issues.
American lawyers are buried in decisions7 and are obliged by the
doctrine of stare decisis8 to expend much energy in interpreting, an-
alyzing, distinguishing, and applying them. Statutes often gather a
fringe of construing cases, inducing as much concern with decisions in
statutory areas as in common law ones. Divergent opinions in one
jurisdiction are often found. Divergent decisions in differing states
are commonplace and are to be found even in the construction of
7 Approximately 2,300,000 decisions have been reported and printed in the United
States. Prince, Lawbooks Unlimited, 48 A.BA..J. 134 (1962); POLLACK, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (2nd ed. 1962).
8 Under this doctrine, a decision resolving a particular point is a precedent which
should be followed in a subsequent law suit in the same court involving the same point
between similar parties. Since identity of facts is requisite to achieving again the
"same point," factual distinctions provide lawyers with arguments and courts with
bases for different results. Changing circumstances can induce a court to refuse to
follow the earlier case and the framing of arguments that circumstances have so
changed is an important advocate's technique. Concerning the U.C.C. and stare decisis,
see note 10 in!ra.
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"uniform" statutes. Federal courts sometimes reach conflicting results
in litigation involving contracts and other matters controlled by Federal
law. Not the least of the lawyer's problems results from the uneven
quality of opinions. Some are not models of exposition.
In the mass, American decisions are indeed an extraordinarily con-
fused and intractable body of legal material. Yet this material, and
the statutes where there are statutes, is the only "primary authority,"
no matter how confused and unclear it may be. Text and periodical
discussions are on occasion cited to or by a court but are only "sec-
ondary authority" and are adjunct to the argument. Secondary sources
are expected to elucidate the cases, to organize them into some sem-
blance of order, and to provide appropriate analytic and expository
comments. If well done, a publication of this type is helpful to lawyers
and to courts and is used by them. Its utility and use resemble but are
by no means identical with the utility and use of treatise discussions
in Japan.
Still another factor which complicates American practice and compar-
isons of American law with Japanese law is the splintering of the
United States into fifty sovereign states, each with its case and stat-
utory law. The superimposed federal system has its own concomitant
body of federal law which is at some points relevant in private com-
mercial transactions. This arrangement of necessity engenders many
choice-of-law problems of types encountered by Japanese lawyers only
in international transactions and produces comments phrased in terms
of the "majority rule" and the "minority rule"-terms which both re-
flect and summarize the diversity in the laws of the different states.
There will also be in a given state various gaps in the case and statutory
coverage, a gap which the lawyer fills as best he can at the advisory
level by attempting to estimate what the appellate court in his state
will hold. In litigation he musters for the argument the precedents
from other states in terms both of quality (as he sees it) and quantity.
One by-product of this welter of multiple jurisdictions and divergent
principles is danger for the person who would attempt sweeping
generalizations about the American law. Especially hazardous is the
framing of sweeping generalizations about the American law of per-
sonal property security. Some of the generalizations made in the
discussion which follows take no cognizance of various local deviations.
The remarkable lack of unanimity in the positions earlier reached in
the various states on property-security problems is being considerably
[VOL. 39
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ameliorated by enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (which
will be referred to hereafter as U.C.C.). This statute has been adopted
in 29 states and the District of Columbia, and appears likely to be
enacted in most of the other states. It is remarkably well drafted, is
producing a minimum of litigation in which construction is an issue,
and may in general be taken literally as an indication of the expect-
able results in the situations it covers.' The provisions of the U.C.C.
are for the most part detailed and specific, giving the lawyer far more
precise answers than are provided by the Codes or special security-
transaction statutes 0 of Japan.
POSSESSORY SECUPrY
Creating the Security Interest
An obligee who takes tangible personalty of an obligor into his posses-
sion to hold for security (without at the same time purporting to take
a transfer of a proprietary interest, i.e., "title") will achieve, save for
a few notable exceptions, roughly the same legal relations in Japan as
in the United States. The traditional common law name for such an
arrangement is "pledge,"1 and this nomenclature will probably con-
tinue in U.C.C. states although that statute employs the phrase "secu-
rity interest" to cover all types of transactions." The basic Japanese
term is shichiken,2 which translates readily enough as "pledge." Un-
9 The U.C.C. has been enacted in Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The initial enactment occurred in Pennsyl-
vania in 1953. Copies of a volume combining the current Official Text of the U.C.C.
and the Official Comments can be obtained from West Publishing Company, St.
Paul, Minnesota. The relatively small volume of appellate cases construing the U.C.C.
is reflected in the pertinent Uniform Laws Annotated volumes. COOGAN, HOGAN &
VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER TE U.C.C. (1963), is the first true treatise
on Article 9 of the U.C.C. Volume 1 has been published. Volume 2 is scheduled to
appear soon.
10 These statutes are cited or discussed at notes 78, 122, 124 infra. In the application
of the detailed provisions of the U.C.C. by courts of many states there will be con-
siderable risk of divergence and hence of encroachment on the U.C.C. goal of uni-
formity. It has been suggested that the risk will be diminished if courts will return to
the U.C.C. for answers rather than to case precedent. Hawkland, Article 9 Meth-
odology, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 531 (1963). See also note 181 infra.
11 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 128 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 1
(1941).
12U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1) (a), 9-203. Section 9-102(2) recognizes that
lawyers and businessmen may wish to use the prior terminology and documentation
by providing: "This Article applies to security interests created by contract including
pledge, assignment..."
13 CIvI. CODE arts. 342-68 appertain to pledges. In the general organization of the
law relating to property interests, CIvI. CODE art. 175 recognizes several kinds of
19641
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derlying the property transaction (i.e., the transfer of possession),
there will be an agreement which need not in either country be in writ-
ing. Good commercial practice, however, dictates documentation which
will obviate the risk of dispute, and written pledge agreements are
common in both countries.
What is involved in taking "possession"? The obvious answer is that
there must be an actual physical delivery of the thing," but this is just
a beginning point. Principles and techniques have evolved in the United
States which permit a pledge in things already in the obligee's posses-
sion, 5 of things in the possession of a third person, 6 and of bulky
things the manual transmission of which is impracticable.' It is also
possible at common law for a pledgee to surrender a pledged chattel to
the pledgor for limited periods and purposes; the pledge continues as
to the pledgor and his creditors, although bona fide purchasers from
the pledgor will take free of it. 8 There even are a few situations in
which a legal relationship denominated "pledge" can exist, in some
states, without possession. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act provides
for a short-duration pledge without delivery of the subject matter."l
relationships denominated "real rights." Shichiken is included. Article 175 also
expressly forbids the creation of other kinds of real rights save as may be permitted by
special statutes. See the discussion at notes 76, 78, 122 infra.
14BROWN, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 625, text accompanying n. 10; RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 5 (1941).
5 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 626, text accompanying n. 13; RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 7 (1941). This common law principle presumably appertains in U.C.C.
states. The U.C.C. does not define "possession."
16 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 626, text accompanying n. 14; RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 8 (1941). Although the U.C.C. does not undertake a general definition of
"possession," it does provide that a "secured party is deemed to have possession from
the time the bailee receives notification of the secured party's interest" where the
collateral is in the hands of a bailee. U.C.C. § 9-305. See also § 9-304(3). These
sections state perfection standards; it seems clear that possession so taken will also
satify § 9-203(1) (a).
17 BRowN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 626, text accompanying n. 14; RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 8 (1941). This common law principle presumably appertains in U.C.C.
states.
18BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 683-85; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 11(2)
(1941). U.C.C. coverage of this situation is in terms of perfection rather than of
substantive law. Under § 9-304(5), perfection continues for "21 days without filing
where a secured party having a perfected security interest in an instrument, a nego-
tiable document or goods in possession of a bailee other than one who has issued a
negotiable document therefor..." if the collateral is surrendered to the debtor for
certain specified purposes. It will be noted that this dispensation does not appertain
to chattels other than as indicated. Since continuation of the perfection would not be
meaningful if the security interest does not also continue, the section evidently con-
templates continued existence of such interest even though it was created by taking
possession under § 9-203(1) (a). In the case of a negotiable instrument or document,
§ 9-309 must also be considered. Even a perfected security interest may be lost to a
holder in due course of an instrument or a bona fide purchaser of a document.
'9 UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 3. This statute has been repealed in the states
which have enacted the U.C.C. The latter has no comparable provision. It does
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In other than U.C.C. states contracts to deliver things in pledge will,
after the obligee has extended his credit and when the obligor has the
things, produce a relationship known as an "equitable pledge" which
gives the obligee some of the protection accorded a pledgee." There
are no comparable relationships under the U.C.C. A secured party can
acquire security either by taking possession or by taking a security
agreement, but an obligee who has neither has no security, legal or
equitable."'
For the creation of a pledge Civil Code of Japan article 344 demands
"delivery" of the thing to the pledgee. The conduct requisite to sat-
isfaction of this demand is specified in Civil Code articles 181, 182,
184 under the subheading "acquisition of possessory right."22 In addi-
tion to actual physical delivery, provision is made for accomplishing
the needed possessory control over things already in the obligee's hands
or in those of a third person. Intent is the critical element, including
intent of the obligee that possession be held for him by another as his
representative. Notice to a third person and consent of the obligee suf-
fice to create the requisite representative relationship and the pledge.2"
provide for a short period of perfection as to instruments or negotiable documents
without possession or filing, but only where there is a security agreement. U.C.C.§ 9-304(4).
2o BROwN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 627, text accompanying n. 17, 638-41; RESTATE-
MENT, SECURITY § 10 (1941). An "equitable pledge" is a relationship which permits
the obligee to force delivery or to realize on the things as though he held them. These
steps must however be taken before the intervention of a bona fide purchaser for value
or a levying creditor. State courts, in some number, have protected an equitable
pledgee who succeeded in getting a legal pledge or realization, against a subsequent
liquidator. See e.g., Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wn2d 204, 109 P.2d 312 (1941), in
which the liquidator's attack was made under a state preference statute. The present
Federal Bankruptcy Act appears to be incompatible with the relation back theory on
which these cases rest. See the discussion: Hanna, Preferences as Affected by Section
60c and Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Law, 25 WAsH. L. R-v. 1 (1950); 2 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 475-90 (rev. ed. 1940) ; 3 COLLIER,
BANKRU TCY 1 60.50 (14th ed. 1964). The relation back doctrine is rejected by U.C.C.
§ 9-305, see comment 3.
21. Section 9-203(1) permits the creation of a security interest by either a transfer
of possession to the secured party or the execution of a security agreement, but there
must be one of these. The "security agreement" must be in writing and this require-
ment is a Statute of Frauds which bars any remedy on a non-conforming agreement.
An obligee with a conforming writing has a security interest even though the obligor
refuses to perform an accompanying promise to surrender possession. See § 9-203,
comment 5. A security agreement must be in writing, must be signed by the debtor,
and must describe the collateral. Section 9-203(1) (b). Section 9-105(h) reads:
"'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest.. .!
22 These articles are not directly concerned with art. 344 or with "delivery." It is,
however, the consensus of scholarly opinion that their specification of the techniques by
which possessory rights can be acquired provides also a standard by which the fact of
delivery is to be established.2 3 WAGATSUMA, TAmPo BUTKKENHO (Law of security interests) 86 (3 MimPO HoGS
ed. 1955); YUNOKi, TANPO BUCKENHO 90 (19 HoRTSUGAKU ZENSHU ed. 1959);
Kanayama, Sldchiken, (Pledge) in MINJI HOGAKU JITEN (Dictionary of civil juris-
1964]
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If a pledgee permits the pledgor to resume possession there is some
disagreement in Japan concerning the legal consequences as between
the immediate parties. The decisions sustain a pledgee who asserts
continuation of the pledge 24 but a majority of scholars dispute the
correctness of this result.25 Courts have found that Civil Code article
344 makes possession a requisite for the creation of a pledge but not
for its continuance. The opposed scholarly opinions prefer the contrary
construction of this article. As against the pledgor's transferees and
creditors, the pledgee's situation is governed by Civil Code article 352,
which requires continued possession and makes no provision for tem-
porary return of the collateral to the pledgor for any purpose. The
pledgee will accordingly lose both to creditors and to purchasers (in-
cluding encumbrancers), whether or not they take in good faith.
Field warehousing, an arrangement under which a part of the bor-
rower's premises are leased to a warehouseman whose receipts are
taken by the lender as collateral, has produced in the United States a
good deal of litigation in which the warehouseman's possession has
been the critical issue.2 ' There seems to be no comparable business
practice in Japan.
Possession of a document of title such as a negotiable bill of lading
or negotiable warehouse receipt gives an obvious kind of control over
both document and goods. Delivery of the document for security will
accordingly suffice in the United States to create a pledge of document
and goods,2" although in practice negotiable documents of title are
prudence) 757 (1960). The pledgor cannot of course bold for the pledgee as his
representative. CIVIL CoDE art. 345. A similar limitation exists in the United States.
See U.C.C. § 9-305, comment 2. The American common law is no doubt to the same
effect. See the discussion at note 26 infra.2 4 YAKUSHIjI, DOSAN SHICHI (Pledge on tangibles) 67 (19 Soco HANREI KENKYU
S0SO mimPo ed. 1963).
25 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 86; YUNOXu, op. cit. supra note 23, at 89;
Kanayama, supra note 23, at 757.
26 Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Financing Device, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 221, 403;
Kane, The Theory of Field Warehousing, 12 WASH. L. REV. 20 (1937); BROWN,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 636-37. (It should be observed that the reference, in BROWN,
id. at 637, to the U.C.C. and indicating that filing is required to perfect security in a
field warehouseman's receipts, has been made obsolete by a later amendment of § 9-305.)
RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 11, comment d (1941). Modern practices in this area have
achieved a high degree of assurance for lenders, as methods have been formalized and
adjusted to the demands of courts by concerns which make a business of field ware-
housing. For a good recent example of a badly handled field warehouse and loss of the
collateral to a liquidator of the debtor, see In re Pine Grove Canning Co.. 226 F. Supp.
872 (1963).
274 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1042, text accompanying n. 10 at 2910 (rev. ed.
1936) ; BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 627-29; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 2(2)
(1941). The U.C.C. permits the creation of a security interest by either a transfer of
possession or the execution of a security agreement. Section 9-203 (1). This statute
provides for perfection of security in documents of title, by either taking pos,,ession or
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usually indorsed as well; Japanese law requires indorsement in addi-
tion to delivery.2"
If a non-negotiable bill of lading or warehouse receipt is issued nam-
ing a lender as consignee or depositor the resulting possessory control
will produce a pledge under American law.2" In Japan such an arrange-
ment is rarely used. It would probably result in a proprietary security
(jito tampo) rather than a possessory security.
Negotiable notes and bills of exchange are instruments which closely
interrelate the paper with the right-duty relation of the parties. Deliv-
ery of the paper will sustain a pledge in the United States; in Japan
order paper must also be indorsed."0 In practice, order instruments are
usually indorsed in the United States as well as delivered.
A transfer of a stock certificate for security is normally accomplished
in the United States by delivery of the certificate, indorsed or accom-
panied by a separate written assignment."' The practice in Japan is
filing, and states that perfection as to the document is perfection as to the goods.
U.C.C. §§ 9-304, 9-305. Section 7-504(1) of the U.C.C. reads: "A transferee of a
document, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, to whom the document has been
delivered but not duly negotiated, acquires the title and rights which his transferor had
or had actual authority to convey." Section 7-506 reads: "The transferee of a nego-
tiable document of title has a specifically enforceable right to have his transferor supply
any necessary indorsement but the transfer becomes a negotiation only as of the time
the indorsement is supplied."
28 COM.MCIAL CODE arts. 573-75, 584, 604, 776; WAGATSUmA, op. cit. supra note
23, at 105, 196; YuNori, op. cit. supra note 23, at 108-11.
29 First Nat'l Bank v. Lincoln Grain Co., 116 Neb. 809, 219 N.W. 192 (1928);
RESTATEMENT, SEcURITY § 8, comment a (1941). The U.C.C. provides for perfection
by issuance of the document in the name of the secured party. Section 9-304(3).
This step will evidently also satisfy U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (a). This type of pledge and
the use of a non-negotiable document are preferred by some American lenders in the
case of warehoused goods. Surrender of portions of the goods to this borrower under
trust receipts is thereby facilitated. The price paid for this convenience is loss of
whatever advantage the secured party might have had as a taker of a negotiable
instrument. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-309. See Funk, Trust Receipt v. Warehouse Receipt-
Which Prevails When t7hey Cover the Same Goods?, 19 Bus. LAw 627 (1964).
30 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 629-30; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 2(3)
(1941); WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 114; YuNoKI, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 124. The U.C.C. makes the taking of possession the only method by which security
in a negotiable instrument can be perfected. Section 9-304(1). Sections 9-304(4) and
(5) state limited exceptions. Section 3-201 of the U.C.C. reads: "(1) Transfer of an
instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has [with exceptions
not here germane].... (2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests
the foregoing rights in the transferee to the extent of the interest transferred.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instrument not then payable
to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable right to have the unqualified
indorsement of the transferor. Negotiation takes effect only when the indorsement is
made and until that time there is no presumption that the transferee is the owner."
In Japan the Law on Bills (Tegatah6) art. 19 (Law No. 20, 1932) provides for a
specific type of pledge-indorsement but this is rarely used and ordinary indorsements
are customary. A transaction of this type may contain elements of fito tampo.
SL UNIFORM STocK TRANSFER AcT §§ 1, 9; BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 630,
text accompanying n. 24. The additional requirement of a change in the registration
on the corporate books, made in a few states, is discussed in BROWN, id. at 631. As to
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the same. Although the Commercial Code of Japan transfer require-
ment (delivery and indorsement) is not applicable to pledges, as to
which delivery alone suffices, 2 indorsements or separate assignments
continue to be demanded by most lenders.3
In both countries the indorsement and delivery for security of a
stock certificate, a negotiable document of title, or a negotiable instru-
ment has preponderately title-transfer (as opposed to possessory con-
trol) connotations. The transfer method used is the one routinely
followed by a seller of assets like these. Although it would accordingly
be possible to argue with some plausibility that the legal relations be-
tween secured party and debtor are those of a proprietary security,
which would be a mortgage in the United States and je6to tampo in
Japan, the pledge analysis has so long prevailed as to make it unlikely
that a court in either country would now follow the argument."
Also productive of some analytic uncertainty is the American prac-
tice of employing assignments as the documentation for security trans-
fers of intangibles such as book accounts and contract rights. In the
nature of things these interests cannot be "delivered" and possessory
security in them is arguably impossible. Despite the apparent anomaly,
this type of security arrangement is now commonly thought of in the
United States as a pledge and the applicable legal principles are con-
sonant with the usage. "Assignment" of an existing account or contract
right is equated with "possessory control." 35 Japanese practice and
a stockbroker buying for a customer on margin, see RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 12
(1941). Under the U.C.C. delivery suffices to transfer the certificate, as against the
transferor. Section 8-307. The transferee is, however, not a bona fide purchaser unless
and until he procures the transferor's indorsement.
32 Articles 205-07; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 122; YUNOKI, op. Cit.
supra note 23, at 136; Shiota, Kabushiki no shichiire (Pledge of stock certificate) in
MNjI HOGAKU JITEN (Dictionary of civil jurisprudence) 238 (1960).
33 Most frequently, the lender will insist on delivery of the certificate and a written
assignment which neither refers to the security purpose nor names the assignee. The
lender will often require further that the debtor sign a written agreement authorizing
sale of the certificate. The purpose behind this method of operation is to facilitate
insofar as can be the lender's realization steps. Cf. note 53 infra. Whether the end
result is a pledge is not free from doubt. A transaction of this type may contain
elements of j6to tainpo. WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 125; Shiota, supra
note 32, at 239.
Although a change of registration on the corporation's books is not legally requisite
to the creation of a pledge, failure to take this step will affect the pledgee's legal
relations with the corporation. The latter will not be obliged to treat the pledgee as a
"transferee" of the original stockholder. COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 208, 209.
34 A possible limited exception in Japan is discussed in the text accompanying notes
30, 33 supra. Also see SHINOsIYA, JOTO TAMPO 269-71 (17 SoGo HANREI KENKYU
SOSHO mIMPO ed. 1962).
35 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 629, text accompanying n. 21 at 632-34; 4
WILLISTON. op. cit. supra note 27, § 1042, text accompanying n. 13 at 2910; Comment,
Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and Future Intangibles, 67 YALE
L.J. 847 (1958). The U.C.C. makes filing the only perfection method for accounts,
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theory in this area have achieved a comparable level of assurance,
withal on different bases. Civil Code article 362 both permits a pledge
of intangibles and directs the application to such a pledge (insofar as
appropriate) of the general pledge sections." "Delivery" is a vital
factor in Japan because "assignment" does not equate with "possessory
control" under Japanese law. If the obligation is evidenced by a writ-
ing, the writing must under Civil Code article 363 be handed over even
though it lacks the elements of control which characterize a "critical
document" under American law. If the obligation is not evidenced by
a writing (for example, a book account) there is nothing which can be
delivered. Since "assignment" will not provide a sufficient theoretic
basis for pledge-creation, a shift in approach from "delivery" to "con-
tract" must be made. A pledge of assets like these can be accomplished
only by the formation of a contract between pledgor and pledgee by
which the security interest is acknowledged. The end product of such
a contract is shichiken (pledge), a real right, rather than "obligation."
In normal practice the contract serves also to assign the intangibles
which are the subject matter of the pledge.
Legal Relations Prior to Default
The American common law treats the pledgee of a chattel as a bailee
under a bailment not for use. He is obliged to take reasonable custodial
care of the collateral, has no right to use it, is entitled to reimbursement
for reasonable preservation outlays, is prior in right to interests sub-
sequently created including federal tax liens, and cannot be disturbed
in the debtor's subsequent bankruptcy proceedings." Presumably, use
contract rights, and general intangibles. Section 9-302. The consequences of non-
perfection are specified in § 9-301(1). No effective legal machinery has developed
for presently assigning accounts or contract rights not yet extant. 3 WILLISTON CON-
TRACTS § 413 (3rd ed. 1960) ; U.C.C. §§ 9-204(2) (c), (d). An attempt to take such
assets in pledge embroils the lender in equitable security problems. See notes 20 supra
and 88, 89 infra.
36 WAGATSUMA, op. Cit. supra note 23, at 112-15; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 119-25. The wisdom of article 362 is questioned in BRAUCHER & MIcHIDA, 2
A_-xaIKA SHOTORIHIKIHO TO NIHON MINSHOHO ("American Law on Commercial
Transactions and the Japanese Civil and Commercial Codes") 383 (1961). Under
CIVIL CODE art. 364 the pledgee is obliged to notify the obligor of the assigned chose,
not to create the pledge, but to protect himself against discharge transactions between
the obligor and the pledgor, against a second assignee, and against garnishment by
creditors of the pledgor. Such notice serves the same function as does filing under
U.C.C. § 9-302.
37 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 130; 4 WILLIsToN, op. cit. supra note 27, § 1044
at 2920; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY §§ 17, 22 (1941). Under the INT. REy. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6323, a pledgee takes free from federal tax liens subsequently accruing, and also from
tax liens which accrued earlier, if such liens were not filed or if the collateral is a
"security" and he takes without knowledge. The tax lien will of course attach to the
debtor's equity in the property. Legislation providing for personal property taxes
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can be authorized by the pledgor in or subsequent to the pledge agree-
ment. The U.C.C states comparable duties of care and of reimburse-
ment, and further provides for a limited right in the secured party to
use the collateral." A pledgee of intangibles must be reasonably dil-
igent both in collecting and in taking whatever steps, such as present-
ment and notice, are requisite to preserve the liability of secondary
parties.3 " In Japan, a pledgee's priority position and custodial duties
are very much like those of an American pledgee. 0
Bailment principles supply some additional theoretic boundaries for
American chattel-pledges, particularly significant being the idea of a
divided property. Although the pledgee's possessory interest is a "spe-
cial property" and a piece of the over-all proprietorship, the "title" is
said to remain in the pledgor. Of great practical importance is the
basic principle which prevents the pledgee's possession from giving him
the power, prior to default by the pledgor, to divest the pledgor's title
by a sale of non-negotiable collateral, even to a bona fide purchaser for
and distraints on default can be so framed as to give the taxing body priority over
antecedent security interests. Statutes of this type are not ordinarily made applicable
to the kinds of property which are taken in pledge. Under the Federal Bankruptcy
Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958), the trustee in bank-
ruptcy takes the debtor's assets subject to an existing pledge and can redeem as could
the debtor but cannot disturb the pledgee's possession nor interfere with the pledgee's
remedies. 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 20, 70.04, text accompanying n. 20 at 953-54.
This proposition assumes that the pledge is not vulnerable to recovery by the trustee
as a preference under the Federal Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§96 (1958). Different principles apply in reorganization proceedings.
38 Section 9-207. The duty to use reasonable care cannot be contracted away. Sec-
tion 1-102 (3).
39 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 674; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 18 (1941);
U.C.C. § 9-207.
40 A pledgee holds free of subsequently created national tax liens (to use the Ameri-
can term) and can hold the collateral against a liquidator appointed for the debtor in
subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 95;
YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 23, at 103-05; CIVIL CODE arts. 334, 355; National
Tax Collection Law (Kokuzei ch~shiih5) arts. 15, 17, 18 (Law No. 147, 1959);
Bankruptcy Law (Hasanh6) art. 92 (Law No. 71, 1922) ; Public Sales Law
(Keibaiha) art. 2 (Law No. 15, 1898). It must be recalled that tax liens are not filed
and can be ascertained only by actual inquiry of the appropriate public official. A
prospective pledgee is always concerned with the possibility that tax liens may have
previously attached. A pledgee's priority over general creditors of the pledgor is
assured by CIVIL CODE art. 342. His priority over successors of the pledgor is a neces-
sary corollary of the CIVIL CODE articles authorizing pledges.
A pledgee in possession must exercise the care and attention of a good prudent
manager. He is entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses incurred in the
discharge of this duty. He may, with the consent of the pledgor, use, lend (lease), or
repledge the collateral. As to intangibles, the duty of a good and prudent manager
will embrace whatever steps are necessary to preserve the liability of secondary
parties. CIVIL CODE arts. 350, 298, 299, 348; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at
103; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 23, at 107. Under CIVIL CODE art. 299, "reasonable
preservation expenses" are divided into two categories-"necessary expenses" and
"useful Ii.e., beneficial] expenses." Reimbursement in the latter category is limited.
It will be observed that the pledgee's duties have their source directly in CIVIL CODE
art. 350, not in bailment principles.
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value. 1 On the other hand, the pledgee's possession constitutes a kind
of caveat to persons who deal with the pledgor and precludes their
acquiring title free from the pledgee's interest.
Comparable problems are resolved in Japan by quite different legal
principles. The idea of a "divided property" is not recognized there.
"Ownership" is a real right and the "branch rights" (shibunken) such
as pledge, which can be created by an owner, are also real rights. There
is however a Civil Code article under which one who acquires a mov-
able without negligence and who "has peacefully and publicly com-
menced to possess" it obtains ownership.,2 The process is known as
"primitive acquisition" (genshi skutoku) and the new real right ex-
tinguishes the prior ownership by force of the Code. In the operation
of this principle freedom from negligence is a key factor. One who
buys from a person who does not have actual possession may have
difficulty in showing that he was not negligent. One who buys from a
person in actual possession and who has no knowledge of or reason
to suspect a title defect will probably obtain ownership. It follows
that a person out of actual possession will have trouble finding a buyer.
A pledgor has no practicable means of selling the property free of the
pledge. A pledgee can on occasion find a buyer who meets the indi-
cated standards and who will extinguish the pledgor's interest even
though the sale is made before the secured debt matures. This is a
major point of difference in the pledge law of the two countries. For a
wrongful sale a Japanese pledgee is liable to the pledgor, but for breach
of contract rather than for invasion of a property right in the collateral.
This is another point of divergence between Japanese and American
law.
Redemption
Under the American common law, a pledgor has a right to redeem
which can be exercised after the obligation falls due and prior to sale
414 WILLISTON, op. cit. mpra note 27, § 1044, text accompanying n. 6 at 2918;
RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 23 (1941). As the discussion in Williston indicates, a bona
fide purchaser will take whatever rights the wrongful seller has, which means in effect
that he acquires the rights of a pledgee. See also BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at
694. In the case of negotiable paper, a holder in due course will take free from the
pledgor's interest. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57; U.C.C. § 3-305. A
comparable principle applies to negotiable documents of title. UNIFORM WAREHOUSE
RECEnTS ACT §§ 40, 41; U.C.C. §§ 7-501(4), 7-502. The U.C.C. states a similar rule
for securities. Sections 8-301, 8-302.
42 CIVIL CODE art. 192. As to negotiable paper, stock certificates, and documents of
title, see Law on Bills (Tegatahta) arts. 16(2), 77(1) (Law No. 20, 1932) ; Law on
Checks (Kogitteh6) art. 21 (Law No. 57, 1933); COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 229, 519.
Also see note 115 infra.
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or foreclosure by the pledgee." An important incident of the common
law redemption interest is a principle under which a pledge is ex-
tinguished by a tender even though the tender is not kept good." The
U.C.C. provides broadly for redemption by all persons who have
created security interests, whether possessory or otherwise."
The Japanese Codes say nothing about redemption but it seems
clear on theory that the basic conception of pledge as a security trans-
action places on the pledgee a duty to return the collateral when the
obligation is discharged.46 Breach of this duty should create a cause
of action for recovery of the collateral and damages for its wrongful
detention. No tender rule applicable to pledgors appears to have
developed in Japan, and this is another difference in the pledge law
of the two countries. If a proffer of payment is refused the pledgor's
recourse must be to litigation comparable in purpose and results to
the American redemption action. There is a Civil Code provision
which protects some pledgors against forfeitures.4 '
Remedies of a Pledgee
Public sale of pledged tangibles upon due notice to the pledgor and
to the public, and collection of pledged intangibles, have been the
traditional common law remedies. Foreclosure by action is also avail-
able in the infrequent situation which makes it desirable.48 In practice,
these remedies are often supplemented by draftsmen of pledge agree-
ments, as courts have sustained significant contractual amplifications
of a pledgee's remedial position. American judges have devised an
important counterbalancing safety factor in a requirement that a
pledgee's sale be fairly conducted.49
43 RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 54 (1941).
4 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, text accompanying nn. 89 and 90 at 678, 679; 4
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 27, § 1043, text accompanying n. 2 at 2913; RESTATE-
MENT, SECURITY § 37 (1941).
45 Section 9-506: "At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral
or entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or before the obliga-
tion has been discharged under Section 9-505 (2) the debtor or any other secured party
may, unless otherwise agreed in writing after default, redeem the collateral by
tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses
reasonably incurred by the secured party...." The phrase "tendering fulfillment"
apparently contemplates payment rather than a proffer of payment. See comment 1.
46 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 103; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 23, at 107.
47 CIVIL CODE art. 349 forbids pledge-agreement terms which would (to use the
American term) clog the pledgor's equity of redemption. This CIVIL CODE article does
not apply to a "commercial transaction" (shokti). COMMERCIAL CODE art. 515. See
also note 51 infra.
48 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 655-77; 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 27,
§ 1043; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY §§ 16, 48, 49 (1941).
49 Typical contract variations include a right to sell at private sale, a right to sell
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The U.C.C.'s highly flexible realization system is available to all
secured parties, who may choose between foreclosure by suit and sale
out of court in any commercially reasonable manner. In appropriate
situations a pledgee can sell publicly or privately, in gross or in lots,
for cash or on credit. Notice to the pledgor is required, save in the
case of perishable goods or goods which threaten to deteriorate rapidly
in value."
At the point of remedies the Japanese law of pledges is a composite
of diverse elements. In "commercial transactions"'" Commercial Code
article 515 permits remedies agreements of the type familiar in the
United States.52 Where this provision is not operative, the Civil Code
controls. Under it, a pledgee is normally obliged to proceed in con-
formity with the Public Sales Law,5" and thus must procure sale by a
public official, who will sell the collateral after notice ("at least five
days") to the "interested parties" and to the public. On a showing that
special relief is needed, the pledgee can realize by a type of judicial
proceeding which bears some resemblance to an American foreclosure
action; 5' the successful pledgee obtains a decree which directs that he
shall have title by paying a sum fixed by court-appointed appraisers.5
without notice to the pledgor, a right in the pledgee to purchase at his own sale, and a
right to sell intangibles. BROWN, op. cit. upra note 11, at 660, 661, text accompanying
n. 67 at 672. "A pledgee, in exercising his right to sell the subject matter of the
pledge to satisfy the debt, has placed on him many of the duties of a fiduciary for the
pledgor, bound to deal fairly with the latter and to secure a reasonable price for the
property sold." BROWN, id. at 662.
5o U.C.C. §§ 9-501, 9-504, 9-507. Intangibles of the obligation type can be collected.
Section 9-502. See CooGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 9, 11 8.01-8.09.
51 "Commercial transactions" are defined in Coam:crAL CODE arts. 501-03. In
practice article 515 encompasses pledges made by a merchant.
52 See WAGATSUaA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 97; YuNoKI, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 106.
53 Crvm CODE art. 342; Public Sales Law (Keibaiho) arts. 3, 7-9 (Law No. 15,
1898). The relief is routinely obtainable on default by the pledgor. WAGATSUMA, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 95; YuNOxi, op. cit. supra note 23, at 104. Cwvnm CODE art. 349 in
effect forbids sale by a pledgee, and accordingly operates to prevent pledge-agreement
clauses calculated to permit either public or private sale by the pledgee from being
operative. This section does not however prohibit agreements between the parties
concerning disposition of the collateral, entered into after default. WAGATSumA, op.
cit. supra note 23, at 95, 96; YAKusNIjI, op. cit. supra note 24, at 94. It is also of some
theoretic interest to observe that a pledge agreement can give the pledgor an option to
surrender title to the pledgee in satisfaction of the debt at maturity. Takahashi v.
Kawamura, 10 Daishin-in minji hanketsuroku [hereafter cited Minroku] 431, 434
(Sup. Ct., April 5, 1904) ; YuNoKr, op. cit. supra, at 106; YAx:usHi i, op. cit. supra,
at 99.
54 CIVIL CODE art. 354. A showing that public sale would entail expenses which
would be excessive in relation to the value of the collateral should suffice. WAGATsUMA,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 95.




Accounts Receivable-Some Special Problems
Dominion and Control. In the distribution of goods, unsecured
open-account credit has long been a striking feature of American
business practice at all levels-manufacturer to wholesaler, wholesaler
to retailer, and retailer to consumer. Pending collection it is often
desired to turn accounts into currently available working capital and
highly refined techniques for doing so have evolved. Accounts are
sometimes sold outright to a buyer who will at once inform the account
debtors and effect collection himself. Accounts may be used as col-
lateral, and as previously indicated,56 the resulting security transaction
is commonly denominated a "pledge." A pledgor often wants to collect
the pledged accounts in order to maintain contact with his customers
and to save on collection expenses. He may prefer that his customers
not be informed of the assignment. Both purposes are, on occasion,
implemented in an arrangement known as "non-notification financing."
An assignment of an account involves the assignee in a complex of
basic contract and statutory principles which regulate his legal rela-
tions with a second assignee and with the assignor's creditors. As to
successive assignments, the American common law developed a schism.
In a majority of states, the first assignee would prevail over a sub-
sequent one, whereas in a minority of states, a first assignee who failed
to inform the account debtor of his assignment would lose to a sub-
sequent bona fide purchaser of the account for value." At common law
an assignee was generally protected against the assignor's creditors."
The American practice has been much changed by statutes, including
the U.C.C. In many states an assignee, whether by way of sale or
pledge, is now obliged to file a notice of his financing with a public
official on pain of subordination to other assignees and creditors of
the assignor. 9
There was a period in the United States during which a pledgee of
56 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
574 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 902 (1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 435 (3rd ed.
1960).
58 4 CoRBIN, op. cit. supra note 57, § 903; 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 57, § 434.
59 See the discussion in 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 57, § 435A of the situation
apart from the U.C.C. The U.C.C. requires the execution of a security agreement as
to collateral which cannot be taken into the secured party's possession (§ 9-203), and
demands filing for assignments of contract rights, accounts receivable, and general
intangibles. Sections 9-102, 9-302(1). The consequences of non-perfection are indicated
in § 9-301. See Comment, Effect of Uniform Commercial Code on Receivables Fi-
nzancing, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1529 (1963). Although the U.C.C. does not define "posses-
sion," it is inferrable from § 9-305 (which deals specifically with perfection) that
possession cannot under this statute be taken of accounts, contract rights, and general
intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-305, comment 1.
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intangibles who permitted his pledgor to collect them was in many
states obliged to cope with some special and very serious problems.
The concept of "dominion and control," which is an application to
intangibles of a fraudulent conveyance principle first stated in relation
to chattels and which, in effect, makes a non-conforming transfer
voidable as to creditors and liquidators of the assignor, gained wide cur-
rency in the years following the 1925 decision of Benedict v. Ratner."
Because failure to achieve "dominion and control" had such drastic
consequences, and because the precise boundaries of the controlling
legal principles were impossible to ascertain, draftsmen felt it necessary
to employ various expedients in an endeavor to achieve safety for a
non-notification pledge of receivables. These expedients covered a
wide range. Common were agreements requiring 100 per cent account-
ing by the pledgor, in specie, and deposit of all proceeds at frequent
intervals into a special bank account to which the pledgee alone had
access. Not unknown were agreements requiring that all the pledgor's
ledger sheets be stamped "Assigned to (the pledgee)," and contracts
designating an employee of the assignor as the assignee's agent to col-
lect. Also used were various complicated arrangements calculated to
resolve the problems created by return of defective or unwanted
merchandise by an account debtor.
The intolerable demands of the dominion and control rule, and its
uncertainties, induced a movement for its legislative amelioration or
abolition, a movement to which the U.C.C. has given momentum.6'
It may be doubted that the dominion and control idea will have in the
60268 U.S. 353 (1925). The basic principle was first stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court as a purported finding of New York law. State courts followed, in some
number. Annot., 85 A.L.R. 222 (1933). Some of the ramifications of the principle are
discussed in Comment, Contract Rights as Commercial Security: Present and Future
Intangibles, supra note 35, at 877. See also COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. ITII 3.07, 3.08 (1963).
61 Note, Accounts Receivable Financing-Limitation Upon Control by Borrower,
24 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 598, 601 n. 31 (1949). U.C.C. § 9-205 provides: "A security interest
is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use,
commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including returned or repossessed
goods) or to collect or compromise accounts, contract rights or chattel paper, or to
accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or to use, commingle or dispose of
proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to
account for proceeds or replace collateral." REV. CODE WASH. § 63.16.080 reads:
"Irrespective of acquiescence, consent or permission by the assignee, no act or omission(including the exercise of dominion and control), by the assignor with respect to an
assigned account, the proceeds thereof, or goods sold and returned, shall invalidate the
right or lien of the assignee upon any balance remaining owing on any such account
or on any other assigned account." REV. CODE WASH. § 63.12.030 contains a similar




future any commercially significant application in the United States in
accounts receivable financing.
There are no priority or dominion problems in Japanese pledges of
accounts. Civil Code article 364 provides that an assignment is in-
operative against the account-obligor and all third persons unless the
account-obligor is notified or consents. The article evidently means
that the assignee's position is invulnerable if he gives such notice or
obtains such consent. In practice, account debtors are routinely
notified and disputes about priorities do not arise.
The idea that the account-obligor must be notified, on pain of his
effective discharge by performance to or settlement with the assignor,
is entirely familiar in the United States. The idea that such notice is a
necessary safeguard to third persons has been rejected in most of the
United States, as was noted above. Public notice by filing, the solution
for third party protection which is rapidly becoming the American
rule, has found no place in the Japanese law as to intangibles.
No rule like that of Benedict v. Ratner exists in Japan. A Japanese
pledgee of accounts usually prefers to collect them and does so, but for
business rather than legal reasons. Civil Code article 367 states his
right to collect, and the pledge-contract need not contain any particular
reference to this detail.
That non-notification financing is occasionally used was found in
the course of a field investigation of security practices by the Japan
Association of Private Law, and was reported in Shik6 (1959). As
accounts become a more commonly used collateral, this type of ar-
rangement may very well come into wider favor. Properly employed,
it has advantages for both parties.
After some travail and a period during which the legal position of
a Japanese security arrangement encompassing future accounts was
doubtful, a favorable decision involving a comparable future-inventory
problem has appeared. This case, which was concerned with jdto
tampo and is discussed later in connection with inventory,6 2 may en-
courage continued efforts to work out an effective method for taking
security in an asset pool which consists of or contains intangibles." A
62 Kishimoto Sh6ten v. Mori Denki K6gy5, infra note 121.
63 The necessity for notifying account debtors poses obvious practical problems in
the handling of future accounts. The lender must ascertain the identity of the account
debtors as accounts come into existence. Some writers feel the problems are probably
insuperable. WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 23, at 117. YAKUSHIJI, KENRI SHICHI
(Pledge of intangibles) 165-72 (19 SoGo HANREI KENKYU sosHo mpo ed. 1963). On
the theoretic side, the contract should suffice to create the pledge when accounts are
created, and the in rem character of a pledge should not pose any serious obstacles. If
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non-specific mass such as "all the debtor's accounts, now extant or
hereinafter created," can be the subject matter of a contract, and the
contract concept of a pledge of intangibles not evidenced by documents
appears likely to outweigh whatever assignment difficulties may be
present.6
Secondary Financing. An American secured party, whether his
security be possessory or non-possessory, will often transfer his in-
terest to another. Such transfers may be sales, or may be security
transactions. In either situation the transfer involves fundamentally
the contract right and the collateral ordinarily follows along by either
implied or express assignment.65 Where the transfer is for security the
end result is a pledge, even though the chattel which secures the as-
signed obligation is not, as in the case of an assigned conditional sale
or mortgage, in the possession of the pledgee. Secondary financing is an
important function of banks and finance companies, the amounts an-
nually involved aggregating many billions of dollars. No further discus-
sion of the American legal situation in this area will be undertaken,
beyond noting that the U.C.C provides some interesting coverage.66
Japanese business practices have not yet developed a comparable range
and volume of secondary financing, although a highly important start
has been made. For a long time credit sales of goods were made either
on open account or under security arrangements worked out between
the buyer and someone other than the dealer, typically a financing
agency of the manufacturer. A good deal of selling is still done that
way. But the automobile industry has generated such a volume of
documents evidencing the future obligations are anticipated, it must be remembered that
their delivery will be essential.
64 WAGATSUMA, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 117; see also note 63 supra.
65 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 224 (1951); RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 29 (1941); 2A
UNIFoRm LAWS ANNOTATED § 40 (1924); Annot., Effect of Assignment of a Condi-
tional-Sale Contract as Collateral, 36 A.L.R. 759 (1925). That this is the result under
the U.C.C. seems to be an inescapable inference. Sections 9-105(1)(b); 9-306(5).
Some jurisdictions have held, in litigation not controlled by the U.C.C., that a security
assignment of a conditional sale vendor's right to receive payment does not per se
transfer his title in the chattel. See, e.g., Bank of California v. Danamiller, 125 Wash.
255, 215 Pac. 321 (1923).
66 Section 9-105 (b) defines chattel paper as "a writing or writings which evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods. When
a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an
instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes
chattel paper." Transfers of chattel paper are regulated by the statute. Section
9-102(1) (a). Security in chattel paper can be perfected by filing, § 9-204(1), or by
taking possession, § 9-305. Filing alone is not complete protection, as a bona fide
purchaser of chattel paper who takes it for value and in the ordinary course of his
business acquires a prior interest if he also receives possession. Section 9-308. Some
of the awkward problems created by the return of the goods to a seller who has
already sold the chattel paper are covered by § 9-306 (5).
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financing need that sources of credit other than the manufacturers have
become essential. First to enter the field were the commercial banks,
which now provide a significant volume of secondary financing by
purchasing automobile paper from dealers on a recourse basis." Sev-
eral finance companies have recently been organized and will function
like those in the United States. It now seems likely that other kinds of
consumer goods having substantial values will achieve the mass market
necessary to support a thriving secondary-financing industry." It also
seems likely that purchase with recourse, rather than pledge, will con-
tinue to be the preferred secondary financing technique.
NoN-POSSESSORY SECUMRY
Basic Types
In the area of non-possessory security there is much divergence be-
tween Japanese and American practice. A security transfer of a propri-
etary interest in a chattel was recognized early in English legal history
although general use of the method was inhibited by the fact that a
mortgagee who failed to take possession was vulnerable to attack by
or on behalf of the mortgagor's creditors." With the enactment during
67 It is estimated that sixty percent of the financing of automobiles is now being
handled by commercial banks. This proportion of bank participation seems likely to
diminish. With increased emphasis on selling has come a drop in the average credit
standing of buyers, a phenomenon well known in the United States. Banks will
probably be selective and they may be expected to absorb a reduced percentage of car
paper as the gross volume of sales goes up. One manufacturer has sought to make the
paper of its dealers more attractive by organizing a company which guaranties such
paper to banks. Banks are currently providing credit at a rate to the buyer of about
8%, which is half the rate charged by other sources.
One interesting aspect of secondary financing is the increased freedom it affords
dealers. Where a sale can be made only if the buyer and the manufacturer's financing
agency can reach agreement on terms, there is a kind of control over the sale which
may not be present if the dealer can arrange his own secured-sale and find a market
for his paper.
6S About 30 to 40% of the electrical appliances now sold in Japan are bought on
credit, most of which is still supplied by manufacturer-supported agencies. Banks are
beginning to move into this area on a secondary-financing basis. Finance companies
have not yet done so.
Yajima, Kinyfamen yori mita kappu wiambai no mondai (Problems of installment
sales reviewed-the financing aspects), and Sat6, Shhisha shinyd no genjo to ntondai-
ten (Present situation and problems of consumer's loans), KIGYoHO KENKYU (Journal
of enterprise law) (No. 103) 21 and 25 (1963), give an interesting general survey of
secondary financing in Japan, and a comparison of the Japanese experience with that
in the United States. Although the dealer-customer transaction falls generally within
the area later discussed under the heading "Conditional Sale," the customer is required
to execute a note, and the dealer is in turn required by the bank or finance company
to indorse this note. The dealer may also be required to enter into a separate recourse
contract which supplements his liability as an indorser.
69 GLENN, FRADULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 491a-95 (rev. ed. 1940).
There is some later authority holding that the presumption of fraud is rebuttable rather




the nineteenth century of filing statutes the chattel mortgage came
into wide use in the United States.
The retained-title variety of security transaction, in which a contract
to sell is coupled to a bailment, the buyer being put into possession
pending full payment, is also of some antiquity in Anglo-American
law. Now known as a "conditional sale," this device is the mainstay
of modern sales security in consumer goods."'
Neither the mortgage nor the conditional sale is adequately flexible
for the handling of security in inventory, whether of finished goods
or of raw materials. To help fill the need for such financing there
developed in the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth
century a tailor-made arrangement called a "trust receipt," char-
acterized by title in the lender and possession in a borrower who held
avowedly as a "trustee" with specified powers of disposition or proces-
sing. After some years of experience in the courts, it became evident
that the trust receipt as a commercial device was in danger of extinc-
tion. Judges in increasing numbers refused to recognize a trust receipt
as sui generis and free from the requirements and limitations imposed
by mortgage and conditional sales principles and filing statutes." Stat-
utory assistance was evidently needed and the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act was prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and promulgated in 1933. This statute was widely
adopted in the period preceding the promulgation of the U.C.C in
1952.' Even more specialized coverage of inventory financing was,
at one time, provided in a number of states by factor's lien acts.7
The proliferation of security devices in the United States brought
both advantages and disadvantages. Each type has characteristics
which makes its use of particular interest in specific situations, and the
over-all system permits considerable flexibility. On the other hand, the
legal criteria for accomplishing each type of security and the appurten-
ant filing requirements are extremely inflexible, making it possible for
a draftsman to get his client into trouble in various technical ways.
In one sense, chattel-security legal development in the United States
70 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 506a-14.
71Id. at §§ 556-61.
72 Id. at §§ 561-64. By 1952, 34 states had enacted the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act. 9C UxlFOm LAws ANNOTATED (Supp. 1958, at 28). A statute of this type is
repealed in the enactment of the U.C.C. There remain, however, several jurisdictions
in which the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is operative.
73 See the discussion, Skilton, The Factor's Liet on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. REv.
356, 609. A statute of this type is repealed in the enactment of the U.C.C. Factors
Lien Acts are no longer a significant element in American commercial law.
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prior to the U.C.C was evolutionary. Certainly the end product was
far from an ideal security system. Many of the flaws have been cor-
rected in the U.C.C. A major contribution of that statute is its formula-
tion, for the creation of non-possessory security, of a method which is
so simple as to be almost foolproof.7" It also provides perfection tech-
niques which are equally free from serious technical pitfalls. 5 Security
documents bearing the labels "chattel mortage," "trust receipt," and
"conditional sale," and containing much of the language traditionally
associated with the label, continue to be used in U.C.C. states. This is
to be explained by the desire of the parties to continue adherence to
the documentary and terminological bases on which business has here-
tofore been done. These differences in form do not per se reflect or
produce any differences in legal relations or results, although the pres-
ence or absence of a particular clause (e.g., a power to sell the collateral
free of the security interest) may produce divergences.
In the Japanese property system, the basic relationship is a "real
right" (i.e., "right in rem"). Article 175 of the Civil Code recognizes
but ten kinds of real rights and forbids the creation of other types save
as specific laws permit. For movables (i.e., tangible personalty) the
only kind of conventional consensual security to be found among the
enumerated categories is shichiken (pledge). The reasons for Civil
Code restrictions on real rights may be summarized this way: a real
right is one which is exercised directly over a specific thing to the
exclusion of any third person who asserts a conflicting interest; the
thing can be pursued and taken, wherever found; so pervasive an
interest must be carefully controlled; obligations should be freely
created, but not real rights."6
74 Sections 9-105(h), 9-203, 9-204. Non-possessory security exists when the debtor
signs a security agreement (i.e., a writing which creates or provides for a security
interest) in which the collateral is identified, value has been given by the secured
party, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. Business considerations will of
course often dictate documentation which goes beyond the U.C.C.'s legal minimum
and which may indeed closely approximate pre-Code drafting. See COOGAN, HOGAN &
VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 60, ffff 2.02-2.04(3). That the U.C.C. security-interest-crea-
tion method is not entirely foolproof is demonstrated by American Card Co. v. H. M.
H. Co. 196 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1963) (holding that a financing statement was not a suffi-
cient security agreement). Noted 25 U. Pirr. L. Ray. 619 (1964).
75 The document which is filed is signed by both parties, gives their addresses, and
describes the property by types or items; in the case of crops or fixtures, the land
must also be described; the debtor's signature may be omitted where the collateral is
proceeds or property brought into the state from another jurisdiction. This document
can be the security agreement, or it can be a separate document. Section 9-402.
7 6 
FUNAHASHI, BUKKENHO (Law of real rights) 16-19 (18 HORITSUGAKCU ZENSHU
ed. 1962); WAGATSUMA, BUKKENHO 23 (2 MIMPO KOGi ed. 1955). The ten classes of
real rights are: (1) possessory right (senyilken); (2) ownership (shoyziken); (3)
superficies (chijken); (4) emphyteusis (eikosakuken); (5) servitudes (chiekiken);
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There is a close resemblance between this rationalization and the
broad concept of third-party protection which underlies the legislation
known collectively in the United States as the "filing system" (or as the
"recording system"). The same concept produced the earlier common
law principle under which a chattel mortgagee who left his mortgagor
in possession was guilty of a fraudulent conveyance."
It is evident that the Civil Code of Japan hardly makes adequate
provision for the financing needs of a modem manufacturing and trad-
ing nation. A partial solution has been attempted in the enactment of
special statutes, as is contemplated by article 175. These statutes
(which are discussed below under the subheading "Chattel Mortgage")
permit the creation of non-possessory security ("hypothec") in some
types of personalty. A routine incident of each statute is a public
notice requirement."'
As was surely not contemplated by the framers of the Civil Code,
movables have come into general use as security in arrangements
known as jito tampo, for which there is no direct Code or statutory
sanction. The incidents of these transactions are roughly analogous to
those of the transactions known in the United States as "chattel mort-
gage," "trust receipt," and "conditional sale" and are discussed below
under subheadings to which the American names are appended. The
discussion will demonstrate the existence of some uncertainties about
basic theory. It will also indicate that the expectable third-party prob-
lems are arising and are currently matters of much concern to legal
scholars. Whether the Japanese Diet will legislate in the area encom-
passed by these security arrangements is, at this writing, quite undeter-
minable. It has been suggested that the enactment of a general filing
(i.e., "registration") law for movables would provide a theoretic basis
for the hypothecation of such property, in addition to serving the more
obvious functions of a filing or recording system.79 No such statute has
as yet received serious legislative consideration.
(6) right of common (iriaiken); (7) possessory lien (ryachiken); (8) preferential
right or charging lien (sakidoritokken); (9) right of pledge (shichiken) ; (10)
hypothecation (teitken) of immovables. Crvm CODE arts. 175-398. (Some special
statutes have been enacted. They are cited in note 78 infra.)
7 See text accompanying note 69 supra.
78 Farming Movables Credit Law (N4gy5 dosan shinzyOh5) (Law No. 187, 1951) in
2 EHS No. 2191; Motor Vehicles Hypothecation Law (Jidsha teithO) (Law No.
187, 1951) in 2 EHS No. 2185; Aircrafts Hypothecation Law (Kikaki teithW) (Law
No. 66, 1953) in 2 EHS No. 2186; Construction Machinery Hypothecation Law
(Kensetsa kikai teit6ho) (Law No. 97, 1954) in 2 EHS No. 2187. See the discussion
at notes 122, 124, 125 infra.
79 Harashima, Dosan teit6 (Chattel mortgage) in Mixx oGAru JIrrtEN (Diction-




The mortgage has become the familiar work-horse in all manner of
borrowed money security transactions in the United States, and is
occasionally used in purchase money transactions. Drafting is var-
iously handled. In some states the simple phrase "I mortgage" serves
to indicate both grant and defeasance. In others the traditional bill of
sale plus a defeasance phrased in null-and-void language is still used.
In some states legal title is said to pass to the mortgagee, while in
others the mortgagee is said to receive only a lien. It would probably
be sounder to say that in any state only a security interest passes and
the exact nature of that interest varies in different jurisdictions."0 If
the mortgagee does not take possession of the chattel, he is obliged to
accomplish public notice of his claim in the manner provided by the
controlling state or federal statute. Although these statutes vary in
details, the essence of their demand (apart from the U.C.C.) is that
a copy of the mortgage shall be placed in files which are in the custody
of a public official who will index them alphabetically (on a grantor-
grantee basis). Under the U.C.C., either the security agreement or a
short form of notice can be filed. These files are open to public inspec-
tion.8
The mortgagor ordinarily remains in possession, has remedies against
anyone who wrongfully interferes with his possession or damages the
chattel, can use the chattel in the customary ways, and can alienate his
interest.82 When the debt matures, and pending realization by the
mortgagee, the mortgagor and his successors in interest have a right to
redeem the property by paying the secured obligation."3 This redemp-
security interests) 73, 130-32 (3MImPo KOGI ed. 1955). See also the discussion at note
118 in !ra.
80 JONES, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 1-34.
81 Id. at §§ 176-235; Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUNM. L.
Rv. 617 (1931); U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-402. See note 75 supra. In some states a
mortgagee accomplishes filing, effective from the inception of the transaction, if he
delivers the mortgage document to the filing official (with the fee) within a stated
period after the inception of the transaction. In other words, filing has retroactive
effect. The interim "free" period presents grave problems for persons who search the
record. Scrutiny of the files with negative results is no assurance that a mortgage
filed later will not be prior in right. This type of filing statute is curiously ambivalent
and is largely ineffectual as a protective mechanism for third persons. The U.C.C.
does not provide a free period for most types of transaction. A limited exception is
made for purchase money security in § 9-301(2).
82 JONEs, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 447a, 448, 454, 455. Under the U.C.C., the right
to possession is a matter for agreement (§§ 9-201, 9-503) and the alienability of the
debtor's interest is expressly declared (§ 9-311).
83 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 681-91; U.C.C. § 9-506. A legal tender also
terminates the security interest, in some states. JONES, op. cit. supra §§ 632-37; Note,
Tender Necessary to Discharge a Mortgage Lien, 10 COLUm. L. Ray. 252 (1910).
[VOL. 39
PERSONAL PROPERTY AS.COLLATERAL
tion interest is not vulnerable to creditors, liquidators, or successors
of the mortgagee. Third persons who deal with a mortgagor in posses-
sion are, in theory, protected by public notice of the mortgage.
A mortgagee who perfects his interest by filing or by taking posses-
sion is prior to subsequently accruing federal tax liens and (in general)
to subsequent artisans' liens, has appropriate remedies against third
persons who damage his interest, 4 and on default can foreclose or (in
most states) exercise a power to effect a non-judicial sale of the collat-
eral if the mortgage document or a statute so provides.8 5 The mort-
gagee's proprietary interest under a perfected mortgage is not vulner-
able to successors, transferees, general creditors, or liquidators of the
mortgagor, with a limited exception as to inventory and buyers in
ordinary course, which will be discussed later.
There are no legal restrictions on the kinds of financing which can
be secured by a mortgage; it can be used to secure a loan, a contract
or statutory duty, or the unpaid purchase price in a sale transaction.
There are no legal restrictions on the use of mortgages, in terms of the
purpose for which the loan shall be made (e.g., to provide working
capital, to finance the acquisition of capital assets, to defray operating
expenses). A mortgage can be used to secure an obligation antecedently
incurred by the mortgagor or by another; as it is a conveyance, there
8 JONES, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 447, 447a, 448, 474. Federal tax lien priorities
are governed by the statute discussed in note 37 supra. Personal property taxes, levied
by states, ordinarily become liens only on distraint or some comparable process. The
relative priority of such a lien and a prior filed mortgage is variously determined in
different states. See the discussion, Casenote, Mortgages-Priorities-Liens on Real
Estate Arising from Taxes on Personal Property, 42 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1929);
Note, Conditional Sales: Tax Lien: Priority of New York State Highway Use Tax
Liens Over Conditional Vendors' Interests: International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537 (1956), 42 Co.xELL L.Q. 558 (1957) ; Note, Iowa Tax Liens
and Their Priorities, 47 IowA L. REv. 121 (1961). Different kinds of personal prop-
erty tax may be handled differently in one state. Cf. REv. CODE WASH. §§ 82.32.220;
84.60.020. As to artisans' liens, see Whiteside, Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee
or Conditional Seller and Subsequent Lienors, 10 CORNEM. L.Q. 331 (1925). If the
mortgagor was in possession, some types of artisans' liens will in some states be prior
even though the mortgage is filed. If the mortgagor becomes a bankrupt while in
possession the custody of the property passes to the bankruptcy court and the permis-
sion of that court must be obtained before undertaking realization steps. The court
will ordinarily grant a petition for leave to realize, but may, if the best interest of the
estate appears to be thereby served, direct sale by the trustee in bankruptcy free of
the mortgage. The mortgagee's interest will then attach to the proceeds of such sale.
Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931), Noted 7 IND. L.J. 502, 16
MINN. L. REV. 94, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 412 YALE L.J. 445; CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
ff 70.97(2) (14th ed. 1964). It is assumed that the mortgage was properly filed and
that it was not preferential.
8 5 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 699-712. It will be noticed that in a few states
the mortgagor's interest ends on his default, subject to equitable intervention. The
U.C.C. contains detailed and sensible remedies provisions. Sections 9-501 through
9-507 permit realization by either foreclosure or a non-judicial sale. The latter, which
can be public or private, must meet a standard of "commercial reasonableness."
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is no requirement either of consideration or of value for its accomplish-
ment. Generally speaking, any kind of chattel can be mortgaged, and
any alienable interest in a chattel.86 Any kind of obligation, past,
present or future, can be secured."
The mortgage is indeed a flexible security, one which adapts readily
to a wide variety of business situations. It does have weaknesses. The
principal ones are consequences of the failure of the American common
law to develop a theory under which after-acquired assets can be
adequately handled, and of fraudulent conveyance rules which hamper
the use of inventory as collateral.
Save where a statute otherwise provides, an attempt to presently
mortgage assets to be subsequently acquired by the mortgagor is abor-
tive at law." The purported transfer will, however, be given effect in
equity between the immediate parties and between the mortgagee and
a successor of the mortgagor who is not a bona fide purchaser for value,
provided the mortgagee has extended his credit and the property has
actually been acquired by the mortgagor." Statutes authorizing the
86 Some states have enacted restrictive legislation governing security transactions in
inventory. Skilton, The Law of Mortgages on Merchandise, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 359,
391 n. 64. The U.C.C. excludes a few types of chattel; i.e., such as are regulated by
the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 or a comparable statute, and railroad equipment or
rolling stock. Section 9-102(a), (e).
87 Optional advances made with actual knowledge of an intervening interest in the
property will be protected by the mortgage but the mortgagee will, as to these ad-
vances, be subordinate to such interest. There is some difference of opinion as to
what constitutes an optional advance. An advance made pursuant to legal obligation is
certainly not optional. An advance made to protect a previously-acquired security
interest in the property is probably "mandatory" rather than optional. JoNEs, op. cit.
supra note 69, § 97; OSBORNE, op. cit. supra note 65, § 120 at 295, n. 54. Much of
the litigation and discussion in this area has involved real property mortgages. See
Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances-A Need for Legislation, 47 IOWA L.
REv. 432 (1962). The U.C.C. puts mandatory and optional advances on the same
footing for most purposes. Section 9-204 (5) ; cf. § 9-313 (4) (c). The priorities posi-
tion of optional advances under the U.C.C. has, however, been questioned. See COOGAN,
HOGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 60, 1111 4.09(4) (b), 7.03(2) (b).
88 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 569-71 ; JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 69, § 138. In
some states an exception has been made as to crops. JoNEs, op. cit. supra § 143.
89 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 69, § 577; JONES, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 170-75.
The cited references indicate that an equitable mortagee will lose the collateral to an
intervening bona fide taker for value and that his position in a contest with a levying
creditor has been variously determined. Of particular significance is the position of an
equitable mortgage or pledge in a contest with a liquidator of the debtor. Insofar as
the liquidator takes the position of creditors, the answer is to be found in the local rule
about creditors. More important is the preference problem. The security interest can-
not exist until the debtor has the property. The credit will have been previously ex-
tended, and the security which comes later may be preferential. Many state courts have
resolved this issue against the liquidator on a relation back theory which destroys by
judicial fiat the time interval between credit and security. The present federal bank-
ruptcy act, however, appears to have created a federal rule which will override the
state law on this detail. COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 84, I 60.37, 60.50. The U.C.C.
attempts to meet this difficulty. See note 91 infra.
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mortgaging of future crops became common9 ° but future property
problems received little other legislative attention before the U.C.C.
The latter statute gives effect at law to a security agreement covering
collateral to be subsequently acquired by the debtor. When the prop-
erty is acquired, the security interest attaches without any contempora-
neous expression of transfer purpose, provided value has been given
by the secured party. Perfection can be achieved under a filing
effected before the mortgagor acquired the property.9
If a mortgagor is authorized by the mortgagee to sell the collateral
free of the encumbrance, and is not required to account to the mort-
gagee for the proceeds, the mortgage is arguably fraudulent as to cred-
itors and voidable by them. The argument has been received with
varying degrees of cordiality by American courts. Some have gone so
far as to hold the entire mortgage to be fraudulent as a matter of law.
Others have held such a mortgage to be prima facie fraudulent.92 A
mortgage-clause requirement of gross accounting (i.e., of all proceeds)
cures the difficulty but the cure is often impracticable. Inventory
financing is ordinarily not possible unless the debtor can withhold part
of the proceeds to pay overhead and replace the goods sold. Although
a number of American courts have conceded in principle the validity
of net-accounting mortgages, the critical details (i.e., precisely what
items of overhead expense can be paid from proceeds and precisely
what is permitted in inventory replacement) have usually been left
unspecified in the opinions. Typically unanswered too are the obvious
questions about the frequency and method of accounting. The result-
ing uncertainties make the net-accounting mortgage somewhat less
than an ideal security device even where it is theoretically possible. 3
90 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 69, § 143 at 237, n. 41.
0' Section 9-204(3) states when a security interest attaches. Subsection (4) states
a limited range of future-property exceptions. Section 9-303 makes prior filing effec-
tive. There is perfection when the security interest attaches. In an attempt to over-
come the preference problem indicated in note 89 supra, the U.C.C. provides that
after-acquired collateral "shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the
ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to the
security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given," provided the
secured party initially gave new value to be secured by the after-acquired property.
Section 9-108. Whether this section will prevail against federal bankruptcy attack is
still a mooted question. See: Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to
After-Acquired Property Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 194 (1959);
Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
inercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 49 (1962) ; Kennedy,
7he Trustee in Bankruptcy under the Uniform Comnercial Code, 14 RUTGERS L. Rav.
518 (1960). See also COoGAN, HoGAr & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 60, 111 1.01-11.07,
02 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 69, §§ 582-591; CoLLImR, op. cit. supra note 84, 1 70.77.
03 Cohen and Gerber, Mortqaqes of Merchandise, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 1338 (1939) ;
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The obvious solution to the confusion and restriction evident in these
common-law developments is legislation. A movement for this method
of correction has reached its fullest expression in the U.C.C, which
completely abrogates the hampering principles.9"
A lender may be tempted to solve the fraudulent conveyance prob-
lems discussed above by simply forbidding sale by the mortgagor,
where the inventory is of a type (such as motor vehicles and major
appliances) which lends itself to the arrangement. Typically such a
mortgage will provide for the release of individual items of collateral
on payment of indicated amounts to the mortgagee, and forbid sale
by the mortgagor save on prior consent of the mortgagee. The idea is
that the mortgagor will find a buyer and close a sale with a contempora-
neous payment on the secured debt. Courts have discouraged resort
to this expedient, by decisions which give clear title to a buyer in or-
dinary course of business even though the mortgage is filed and the
mortgagee has not consented to the sale. The U.C.C codifies a com-
parable rule.9"
Skilton, supra note 86, at 392-98; Kerr, Chattel Mortgages on Shifting Stocks of
Goods in Washington, 11 WASH. L. REv. 199 (1936). See also 1956 U. ILL. L.F.,
which contains several relevant discussions; viz. Weeks, Floating Liens in Inventory
Financing, 557; Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 580; Greenberg, Inven-
tory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 601.
94 Section 9-205, quoted in note 61 supra. Whether the threat to general creditors
ever justified the common-law rule is debatable. Certainly modern credit practices
have achieved a level of sophistication such that trade creditors are not apt to be de-
ceived by the existence of inventory security no matter what the details of it may be.
Meanwhile, a general law of fraudulent conveyances has developed which is entirely
adequate in the instance of transfers actually fraudulent, whether by reason of intent
or by reason of inadequacy in the value paid by the transferee. These factors, plus the
business pressures for some sensible basis on which the very large values tied up in
inventory can be utilized as collateral for working-capital loans, achieved some legis-
lative recognition before the U.C.C. See Skilton, upra note 86, at 392, n. 64. Statutes
such as REv. CODE WASH. §§ 63.12.030 and 63.16.080 are also indicative. These, in
effect, abrogate the common-law fraudulent transfer rules as to pledges of accounts
receivable and conditional sale contracts. The enactment of a corrective statute does
not mean that lenders will permit borrowers to sell the collateral and pocket the pro-
ceeds. Accounting will continue to be required because it is sound business. The ac-
counting details, which must otherwise be tailored to various technical demands the
exact scope of which can only dimly be perceived, may under such a statute be tailored
to the business situation.
95 On one theory or another, the preferred explanations being ostensible owner-
ship, estoppel, or apparent authority, the buyer has usually prevailed despite the obvious
implications of the filing system and the fact the mortgage in question was filed.
Skilton, Cars for Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Automobiles,
1957 Wis. L. REv. 352, 400; Comment, Waiver of Chattel Mortgage Lien by Estoppel
or by Implied Consent of Mortgagee, With Special Reference to Automobile Cases,
1 IDAHo L. J. (1931) ; Annot., Record of Chattel Mortgage on, or Conditional Sale of,
Automobile or Other Chattel Put or Left in Hands of Dealer, as Constructive Notice,
136 A.L.R. 821 (1942). U.C.C. § 9-307(1) reads: "A buyer in ordinary course of
business [§ 1-201 (9) ] other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged
in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though
the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century, Japan moved ra-
pidly from agrarian feudalism into the industrial age. The transition
entailed heavy capital demands which were in the early stages largely
met by the government. Thereafter an expanding banking system be-
came an increasingly important source of credit both for operations
and for expansion, although the Japanese Government continued to
(and still does) provide some financing assistance of this kind. Heavy
industry and public transportation were the first concern, with general
manufacturing a close second. In recent years there has been much
emphasis on consumer goods and on the export trade in general. It was
inevitable that these economic changes would both increase the in-
cidence and importance of movables and vastly expand the demand for
credit. In a maturing economy the pledge cannot satisfy the need for
personal property secured-credit simply because the debtor must retain
possession in many of the transactions in which chattels are a factor.
Severe pressures are accordingly put on the legal system for the crea-
tion of principles which permit security to be safely taken from a
debtor who retains possession.
Civil Code article 175 and its limitations on the creation of real
rights were discussed above. That article contemplates legislative
expansion of real rights but the Japanese Diet did not enact such a
statute for moveables until 1933.88 Long before then the Japanese
business community was impelled by sheer necessity to devise a way
in which to attain the needed ends in the many types of situations not
encompassed by the Code. They have succeeded, through an ingenious
adaptation of the civil law concept of "obligation" (contract). This
development of jito tampo97 will remind American lawyers of the
development of analogous relationships in the common law, and is
especially interesting because it has occurred in the interstices of a civil
law code system. The adaptability of j5to tampo will remind an Amer-
ican lawyer of the facility with which a security interest under the
U.C.C can be made to serve variant security needs.
The nuances of the legal theory which supports j5to tampo continue
to engage the attention of Japanese scholars, who are far from being
in agreement on some details. That the secured party acquires a legal
06 See the text accompanying note 78 supra. Concerning the special legislation for
"estate" or "foundation" hypothecs (i.e., blanket hypothecs on enterprise assets) cov-
ering both immovables and some kinds of personalty, see note 122 infra.
97 The following discussion is limited to personal property transactions. Jito tampo




relationship to the chattel is well enough established. 8 Moreover,
when the legal incidents are totted up, his interest is a great deal more
like "title" than it is like a "lien" (to use the American terminology)."
Under the more commonly accepted analysis his relationship to the
collateral is the product of contract rather than of grant,"' and the
quantum of his proprietary interest can be varied by contract terms.
This is not a reasoning sequence through which an American lawyer
can move with comfort. A conception of contract as a legally binding
executory promise must be supplemented by more than equitable lien
or equitable conversion ideas in order to achieve an end-result approx-
imating jito tampo.
Since it is an application of obligation theory to ownership, jito
tampo is inherently flexible. In various forms of documentation it
serves in both security-transfer and security-retaining transactions.1
In one variety of the former the lender can take "general ownership"
and achieve much the same position as an American lender would
occupy if he received an absolute transfer for security and did not have
to contend with the rule against clogging the equity of redemption.Y0
9 8 The Japanese Supreme Court has so held. Nagata v. Takahashi, 12 Daishin-in
minji hanreishii [hereafter cited Minshfl] 767, 771 (April 26, 1933); Kawata v.
Yamazaki, 27 Minroku 2164 (Nov. 24, 1921) ; Sat6 v. Masaki, 27 Minroku 1024, 1026
(May 30, 1921) ; Toyoyama v. Ishikawa, 21 Minroku 475, 480 (March 5, 1921);
Muratani v. Shiraishi, 25 Minroku 1373 (July 9, 1919) ; Umezawa v. Asakura, 25
Minroku 1074 (June 23, 1919); Asakura v. Umezawa, 24 Minroku 553 (April 11,
1918) ; Nagata v. Kat6, 23 Minroku 1780 (Nov. 15, 1917) ; Iijima v. Arai, 23 Minroku
24 (Jan. 25, 1917) ; Kawano v. Kawano, 22 Minroku 2193 (Nov. 8, 1916) ; Murakawa
v. Yagami, 22 Minroku 1507 (July 12, 1916); Yamada v. Konda, 21 Minroku 2212
(Dec. 25, 1915); Hida v. Kume, 20 Minroku 865, 872 (Nov. 2, 1914) ; Japan v.
Fukuda, 20 Daishin-in keiji hanketsuroku 1431, 1433 (July 7, 1914); Nishizawa v.
Machida, 18 Minroku 691, 699 (July 8, 1912) ; J6no v. Azuma, 12 Minroku 1172, 1175
(Oct. 5, 1906). Such is the consensus of scholarly opinion. WAGATSUMA, op. cit.
supra note 79, at 226; YUNOKI, TAMPO BU:KKENHO (Law of security interests) 389-
91 (19 HORITSUGAKU ZENSHU ed. 1959); Hamagami, Thto tampo in MINJI HOGAKU
JITEN (Dictionary of civil jurisprudence) 979 (1960).
99 The most emphatic manifestation of this idea is seen in Bankruptcy Law (Ha-
sanh5) art. 88 (Law No. 71, 1922), which refers expressly to j6to tan.po and denies
the debtor's right to assert his title against the secured party's liquidator. The secured
party has all of the powers ordinarily associated with "general ownership," although
their assertion may in a particular situation be in violation of the agreement between
the parties and be a legal wrong in the sense of breach of contract. There is no
"fraudulent conveyance" theory or "equitable remedy" under Japanese law. See the
discussion at notes 106, 113, 114, 119, 145, 153-59 infra.
100 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 228; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at
392-96. See the discussion at note 108 infra.
101 The Exhibits are examples of forms in current use. It will be noted that no
form for a "strict" (as to "strict" see the text discussion following note 102) joto
tampo transaction of the chattel mortgage type is included. Transactions of that kind
are uncommon. See Kat6's report of a field investigation on i6to tampo in SHiao
("Journal of Private Law") (No. 21) 190, 201 (1959). Notice too that appropriate
differences in language characterize "shoyaken ryfiho" (retained title) and trust re-
ceipt transactions from those of the chattel mortgage variety.
102 JONES, op. cit. supra note 69. The mortgagor's redemption right is discussed
[VOL. 39
PERSONAL PROPERTY AS .COLLATERAL
The Japanese debtor cannot, however, expect any help from a chan-
cellor and has only such solace as can be derived from the fact that
he is not liable for a deficiency. In this type of jito tampo, which may
be referred to as "strict," the debtor is personally liable on the obliga-
tion if the lender chooses to enforce it but as to the property, the lender
has only a relationship analogous to an option. The lender must elect
between asserting his ownership, or pursuing the personal obligation.'
Possessory rights are purportedly fixed by the agreement, which will
usually provide for retention of the property by the debtor pending
maturity of his obligation. Under an agreement like this the debtor is
a bailee rather than an owner in possession. Bailments are in general
governed by Civil Code article 662, which provides that a bailor can
take back the goods at will even though there exists a bailment agree-
ment fixing a term. Whether this article applies to jito tampo trans-
actions is debatable. "' Failure of the debtor to pay or tender at
maturity terminates his right to re-acquire the property, as would
failure to pay on the "law day" in the early period of Anglo-American
mortgage law.'05 Nothing in the way of realization procedures, judicial
or otherwise, is needed by the lender in order to establish or clear his
title. "' If the debtor does not surrender the property on demand he is
a "converter" and vulnerable to damages or to a summary repossession
remedy resembling the American replevin action.
The impact of the idea that the lender has "general ownership" is
203 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 234; SHINO=YA, JoTo TA ,o 151-54
(17 SoGo HAMM XENKYU S0SHO miOpo ed. 1962). If he decides to retain the owner-
ship in satisfaction of the debt, the decision is irrevocable. The document will have ex-
pressly recited that he can exercise such a power, and its exercise cannot be retracted.
On the other hand, if he decides that he prefers to be paid, title does not revest in the
debtor unless and until the obligation is actually discharged.
104 Concerning the duties of a debtor in possession, as to the goods, see the discus-
sion of the comparable trust receipt situation in the text at note 149 infra. See also
notes 150 and 151 infra, as to maintenance and preservation expenses. Arguably CivNM
CODE art. 662, which is framed generally and was drafted with an eye to the usual
bailment situation, is inappropriate in a security transaction in which the debtor be-
comes a bailee only because the severance of ownership and possession leads to this
analysis. It can be argued with some force that the agreement ought to control rather
than article 662. Cf. the discussion of a comparable land itto tampo problem, WA-
GATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 232; SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 59, 60,
123-32. See also Kond5 v. Yamada, 18 Minroku 815 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 7, 1912);
Sonohara v. Matsuba, 12 Kakyii saibansho minji hanreishii [hereafter cited Kakyi
minshfi] 1416, 1425 (Sendai High Ct, Dec. 7, 1951).
'O5 In the early common-law period a mortgage conveyed title subject to defeasance
on payment or tender. Failure to pay or tender on the law day ended the mortgagor's
title. JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 69, § 1.10 Haraguchi v. Miyabe, 27 Minroku 570, 577 (Sup. Ct, March 23, 1921) ; WA-
GATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 234; YuNOK, op. cit. supra note 98, at 399.
in § 681. The evolution of the equitable principles which have ameliorated the early
common-law mortgage rules is best seen in the real property area. They are discussed
in OSBORNE, op. cit. supra note 65, §§ 6, 7.
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most evident in contests between the debtor and third persons. The
lender's transferee who takes before the debtor defaults (whether or
not a bona fide purchaser for value), his levying creditor, and his liq-
uidator in bankruptcy, will take the property free from all proprietary,
redemption, and contract rights of the debtor. A legal wrong is done
the debtor by the lender if any of these contingencies develop, a
wrong for which there is only a contract remedy for damages." 7
A second and much more common variety of jito tampo, which may
for ease in reference be called "liberal," comes a good deal closer to
the incidents of a modern American mortgage. The parties may agree,
explicitly or by inference, that the lender shall have a proprietary
interest only for security purposes, i.e., he gets the ostensible or "exter-
nal" ownership while the actual, beneficial, or "internal" ownership
remains in the debtor."0 8 The agreement will usually provide for
repossession and sale of the collateral on default." 9 The sale can be
either private or public and the lender can be a buyer; the lender must
account for a surplus; and the debtor is liable for a deficiency."0 The
107 Such a wrongful disposition would be a breach of contract for which compensa-
tory damages would be recoverable. CivIL CODE arts. 415, 416. Supreme Court de-
cisions: Kobayashi v. Naruse, 10 Minshfi 685, 689 (April 24, 1931) ; Sat6 v. Masaki,
27 Minroku 1024, 1026 (May 30, 1921) ; Kusayanagi v. Sait6, 26 Minroku 1028, 1032
(June 21, 1920). See also SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 173-191; WAGA-
TSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 234; YuNoKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 399; Hama-
gami, supra note 98, at 980, and the text accompanying notes 100 supra and 139, 153-
159 infra.
108 Nagata v. Takahashi, 12 Minshii 767, 772 (Sup. Ct., April 26, 1933). The idea
that external and internal ownership can be severed in this way runs counter to basic
property concepts and is accordingly a debatable rationale. WAGATSUMA, op. Cit.
supra note 79, at 228; Hamagami, supra note 98, at 980. It seems preferable to
acknowledge the existence of identical ownership relations in both types of j6to tainpo
and to attribute the differences in their operation solely to differences in the terms of
the security agreements. WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra at 228, 235; YUNOKI, op. cit.
supra note 98, at 395. See also on this detail the Supreme Court decision cited above.
109 Even if an express provision to this effect is not included, a liberal joto tampo
agreement will produce the same result by interpretation. Yasuda v. Fukunishi, 21
Minroku 174 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 1915); Sugita v. Kawabe, 5 K6t5 saibansho minji
hanreishfi 618, 623 (Osaka High Ct., March 26, 1952) ; SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note
103, at 164-66; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 233. Repossession before
maturity may not be a legal wrong. CIVIL CODE art. 662, previously mentioned in
connection with strict jto tainpo, may operate also in the instance of liberal jito
tampo to give the lender, as a bailor, a right to retake the collateral despite a contract
agreement. (But see the text accompanying note 104 supra.) Sale as owner, before
the debtor's default, is a legal wrong. See the text accompanying notes 107 supra
and 139 infra.
110 Supreme Court decisions: Toyoyama v. Ishikawa, 27 Minroku 475, 480 (March
5, 1921) ; Kusayanagi v. SaitS, 26 Minroku 1028, 1032 (June 21, 1920) ; Muratani v.
Shiraishi, 26 Minroku 1373, 1378 (July 9, 1919). WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79,
at 233; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 398; Hamagami, supra note 98, at 980. A
f6to tampo clause authorizing sale after default merely declares a right which the
lender would have anyway, as a matter of law. Since the lender already has the
"ownership," the idea of a sale to himself presents serious theoretic problems. Japanese
scholars prefer to describe the process by which the lender excludes the debtor without
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lender's interest ends if the debtor pays or tenders his obligation prior
to sale, and disputes about the fact of default can be brought to issue
by the debtor in litigation which resembles an American redemption
action."' When it comes to contests between the debtor and third
persons, however, there is no difference between liberal and strict jito
tampo. The debtor will lose to the types of persons referred to at note
107 above.112
The problems created by a severance of title and possession are well-
known to American lawyers. In both types of jito tampo there is a
considerable risk of conflict between the lender and persons who deal
with a debtor left in possession. In Anglo-American jurisprudence
solutions were first found in common-law fraudulent conveyance prin-
ciples, the gist of which is that a mortgagee who leaves his mortgagor
in possession may lose the property to a levying creditor or liquidator
of, or a bona fide purchaser from, the mortgagor. From this base point
the development in England and the United States has been along the
general line drawn by statutes which permit the mortgagee to accom-
plish public notice through filing with a public official, in lieu of taking
possession"'. Nothing comparable to the indicated fraudulent convey-
ance rule has evolved in Japan for the protection of creditors nor has
any filing statute applicable to jito tampo been enacted. The lender
will prevail in a contest with a levying creditor of the debtor and can
remove the property from the debtor's estate in bankruptcy.1 If,
however, the debtor sells the collateral to a bona fide purchaser the
lender cannot recover it. The reason lies in a basic Japanese legal
principle which protects any purchaser who takes in good faith and
without negligence from a person in possession."' A subsequent taker
a sale to a third person as "estimation," i.e., arriving at a money figure. There is no
element of forfeiture or election here, in contrast with strict jt'to tampo.
M Supreme Court decisions: Takahashi v. Sat6, 26 Minroku 407, 409 (March 26,
1920);. Muratani v. Shiraishi, 25 Minroku 1373, 1378 (July 9, 1919). See also
WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 233; YuNoxi, op. cit. supra note 98, at 399;
Hamagami, supra note 98, at 980.
112 If the debtor loses his interest in one of these ways the lender is liable to him in
contract for damages. See the text accompanying note 107 supra and notes 139, 153-59
infra.
113 See the text accompanying note 69 supra.
114 See notes 156, 157 in!ra.
'15 CIVIL CODE art. 192. For detailed discussions of this article see SuzuKxi, SoKuJi
SHUTOKU (Bona fide acquisition) 84-95 (6 SoGo HANREI KENKYU sosHo MImPO ed.
1962) ; Sono, Minsha-nih ni okeru zen-i shutoku (Protection of bona fide purchaser
under Civil and Commercial Codes-Estoppel and Rechtsscheintheorie), 6 SoGo
HOGAKU (Journal of synthetic jurisprudence) (No. 3) (1963). See also note 160 infra.
In order to prevail under this article, the purchaser must sustain the burden of show-
ing both ignorance of the security interest and lack of negligence. The latter can be a
difficult burden. If he fails to investigate where any suspicious circumstance was
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of security, whether by pledge or jito tampo, qualifies as a "purchaser"
for this purpose.
That Japanese law should have worked out to this end-result as to
a debtor's general creditors is anomalous. A policy of protection
against secret interests is apparent in the limitations on real rights
which are implicit in Civil Code article 175,116 in the filing provisions
of the special hypothec statutes enacted by the Japanese Diet,"7 and
in the rule which protects a bona fide purchaser. Yet even now, when
the expanding volume of jito tampo transactions has emphasized the
risks to persons who extend unsecured credit to the debtor, the wis-
dom of requiring public notice for this type of security is a curiously
controversial topic." 8
Jhto tampo is evidently not a perfect security device. It has aspects
which will probably impress an American lawyer as archaic and quite
inadequate for an advanced economy such as that of Japan. Nor is it
passing unscathed through the crucible of scholarly scrutiny in Japan.
Proponents of a conception of jito tampo which would produce re-
sults more closely analogous to those now reached under a mortgage
in a lien-theory American jurisdiction have been encouraged by a re-
cent tax statute which enables the Japanese Government to seize the
known to him which would indicate the possibility of a defect in the seller's interest, he
may well be found by a court to have been negligent. In the case of wrongful sale
by the debtor the lender has the remedies of a bailor. He can reach identifiable non-
cash "replacement things" (i.e., proceeds) on a theory of subrogation.
116 See the text accompanying note 75 supra. Although CIVIL CODE art. 178 provides
that transfers of real rights relating to movables cannot be set up against third persons
unless the movables are delivered, the force of this provision is virtually destroyed by
article 181, which permits possession by proxy. An argument therefore that the policy
behind article 178 demands subordination of the lender in j6to tainpo transactions to
persons who deal with the debtor would accomplish nothing, even were the court
persuaded that the lender was intended to receive a kind of real right. It is of some
interest that the Japanese law relating to immovables closely approximates modern
American land law insofar as third-party protection is concerned. CIVIL CODE art. 177
states that the acquisition, loss, or alteration of real rights in immovables cannot be
set up against third persons unless the holder conforms to the demands of the
registration law.
117 These statutes are cited in note 78 supra and discussed infra at notes 124, 125.
They require filing.
118 See the statements of Professors Wagatsuma, Hoshino, and Ishii in the Sym-
posium, Jto taMpo, SHIRO ("Journal of Private Law") (No. 22) 16, 37, 38 (1960) ;
and Harashima, supra note 79, at 1488. Particularly interesting is the suggestion of
Professor Wagatsuma that commercial needs would be best served by a jto tampo
system of filing which would operate in terms of debtor-identification rather than in
terms of identification of specific property. Such a statute would closely resemble the
filing provisions of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the U.C.C. The broad
familiarity of Japanese scholars, lawyers, and businessmen with the objectives,
advantages, and drawbacks of public notice legislation in both civil law and common
law countries will make the endeavor to achieve the very best type of statute well
worth American observation, if the Japanese Diet reaches the point of considering a
fito tampo filing system.
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property in satisfaction of the debtor's unpaid taxes, to the exclusion
of the lender, where the due date of the tax precedes the security
transaction."' There is not, however, as of this writing any indication
that jito tampo will receive further legislative attention.
In some particulars, notably in future property and future advance
financing, jito tampo theory readily leads to logical and desirable
results. Future specific property has occasioned little theoretic or
practical difficulty. hito tampo can as a contract operate to create the
contemplated general or external ownership in property to be subse-
quentiy acquired, when it is acquired, provided the thing can be
specifically identified in the contract. 2 Future assets which cannot be
identified, including asset pools such as inventory, have been a good
deal more troublesome. Read literally, Civil Code article 85, which
defines "things" as yiitaibutsu, i.e., "material" or "corporeal," demands
that transfer purpose operate on specific things or not at all. In other
words, an attempt to create a floating lien in inventory may theoret-
119 Although it may be doubted that the Japanese Diet was motivated by other than
a desire to foster the collection of taxes, National Tax Collection Law (Kokuzei
chashaho) art. 24 (Law No. 147, 1959) has been seen by some Japanese scholars as
affecting the theory of jito tampo and as a move toward general recognition of the
security-holder's proprietary interest as only a security interest. See the report of
Professor Mikazuki, in the symposium cited supra note 118 at 2-13. In evaluating
legislative attitudes, however, it may be noted that Bankruptcy Law art. 88, supra note
99, remains unchanged and is of course quite incompatible with any analysis of jito
tampo as vesting only a "lien" or "security interest" in the security holder. On view-
ing the tax statute in relation to jtio tampo theory, some scholars find it merely
confusing. In their estimation, an over-all revaluation of the legal incidents of joto
tampo might be a worthwhile subject for legislative discussion, but an isolated statute
and especially a tax statute cannot very well affect the theory of this security arrange-
ment. See the statement of Professor Yunoki in the symposium cited supra note 118
at 19, and the statement of Professor Nakagawa in the same symposium at 24. See also
YuNoxI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 402-04. Meanwhile, apropos of the tax statute,
procedures relative to tax receipts and public notice of tax liens which are well known
to American lawyers are evidently necessary for the protection of the security holder.
Japanese lenders, and particularly banks, have not so far adjusted their practices to
conform with the new tax statute with the unanimity which would be expectable. The
statute also emphasizes a kind of dispute which is familiar to American lawyers, viz.,
whether a transfer absolute on its face is in actuality for security. See the statement
of Professor Yunoki in the symposium cited supra note 118 at 19.
Another area in which disagreement about the proper theoretical analysis of j to
tampo occurs is in the operation of the Corporate Reorganization Law (Kaisha
kaseffhi) art. 123 (Law No. 172, 1952). That statute, as does the comparable Ameri-
can legislation, Federal Bankruptcy Act § 116(4), 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
516(4) (1958), permits the stay of realization steps by secured creditors. The specific
reference in the Japanese statute is to hypothecs and rights of preference. Some lenders
have sought to avoid its possible applicability by using iSto tampo. See the statement
of Professor Kawamoto in the symposium cited supra note 118 at 31. The predominant
scholarly opinion is that the maneuver is theoretically sound, however practically
objectionable it may be; there is, however, some contrary opinion. See the statement
of Mr. Ishida, supra note 118, at 28.
120 The "intention" principle in the transfer of real rights supports this conclusion.
See CIVIL CODE arts. 176, 183.
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ically fail as to the future goods for lack of subject matter. Despite the
theoretic problems, security transactions of this kind were occasionally
used before 1955, primarily because there was no other practicable
way in which to handle some kinds of financing. An important break-
through came in that year in an Osaka District Court case sustaining
such a jito tampo transaction.1  The floating-lien type of security in
inventory may in the future become increasingly common.
Something of the economic and legal pressures operating in the
general area of the Japanese floating lien can also be observed in the
Enterprise Hypothecation Law. This statute authorizes the creation
of a blanket hypothec on all of the assets of a borrower, for the security
of a bond issue. Public notice is required and takes the form of a
notation in the corporation registry maintained by the Bureau of
121 Kishimoto Sh6ten v. Mori Denki K6gy6, 6 Kakyai minshfi 2559 (Dec. 6, 1955),
HANREI JIHO (No. 67) 16 (1956). This case involved inventory stored in a warehouse
owned by the debtor. The jtto tampo was created to secure a seller's present and
future credit sales and contained a cross-tie provision which made all of the collateral
security for all of the debtor's obligations. The debtor was authorized to sell the goods
in the ordinary course of business. He was required to account for ten percent of
proceeds and to replace the goods sold. The debtor defaulted and the seller sued to
obtain possession of the collateral. The debtor defended, asserting the joto tampo to
be void because the subject matter was not specified when the agreement was made.
This defense was not successful. Said the court: "Where a debtor establishes jito
tantpo on the whole of his inventory, the content of which is always changing, it would
be against the parties' intention to break up 'inventory' into its component small pieces.
Since the inventory as a whole can be taken as having an independent economic value
apart from its parts, in the present economic environment, it must be possible under
our law to take ownership in the whole for security, recognizing it to be one independ-
ent thing (especially in this case, where the warehouse is independent from the debtor's
other assets and all of the inventory in that warehouse was covered by the agreement).
Therefore, we hold that the jito tampo of the inventory as a whole is a contract to
transfer ownership of one thing as security."
Particularly interesting in the court's decision is the combination of two ideas-
inventory can be owned as a whole although individual component goods can be
separately owned. The former provides the theoretic base on which CIVIL CODE art. 85
is deemed to be satisfied, while the latter sustains sales of individual units by the
debtor. Favorable comments on the case are: SHINO IYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at
251-55; BRAUCHER & MICHIDA, 2 AMERIKA SHOTORIHIKIHO TO NIHON MINSHOHO
("American Law on Commercial Transactions and the Japanese Civil and Commercial
Codes") 484-86 (1961) ; Hasebe, ShMin no jto tam po o meguru h~ritsu mondai(Legal problems of j45to tampo on merchandise), KINYU Homu jijo (No. 96) (1955) ;
t6, Shflgobutsu no jito tampo ni tsiute (Jto tampo on group assets), KINYu
HOMU jijo (No. 116) (1956). The court's analysis is one which Professor Wagatsuma
has advocated. He argues that so long as an assemblage of goods has an independent
economic value there is no reason why it should not be treated as one thing under the
law. Wagatsuma, Shfig5butsu (Group assets) in HORITSUGAKU JITEN (Dictionary ofjurisprudence) 1231 (1935) ; WAGATSUMA, DOSAN TEITO SEIDO (Chattel mortgage
system) 61-65 (1957) ; WAGATSUMA, MIMPO SOSOKU (General principles of civil law)
178-80 (1 MIMPO KOGI ed. 1955). Also see Kai, Shiig6butsu (Group assets) in MINJI
HOGAKU JITEN (Dictionary of civil jurisprudence) 872 (1960).
The court's emphasis on the fact that all of the goods in the warehouse were covered
by the j*to tampo suggests that it might not be possible to take security in an un-




Judicial Affairs to the effect that a hypothec has been created in all
of the corporate enterprise. There is no public notice as to individual
assets."' Presumably there was a need for this kind of financing and
the wisdom of preserving the going-concern value of the debtor dictated
coverage of all assets as of any given point in time-including assets
acquired after the hypothec was given. The Japanese Diet went on,
however, to subordinate the security of the bond holders to subsequent
transactions in which specific collateral was taken by other lenders.
The limitation, which apparently stemmed from an unwillingness to
sustain fully the security in an asset pool, has effectively discouraged
use of hypothecs of this kind, save for borrowers of exceptional finan-
cial stature.
Future advances are critical in a floating lien transaction, and are
often important in other types of financing. Jito tampo future advance
clauses present no legal problems in Japan. 2
122 Enterprise Hypothecation Law (Kigya tampoh5) (Law No. 106, 1958) in 2 EHS
No. 2198. As to the background of this statute and the prospects for analogous future
legislation, see Michida, The Legal Structure for Economic Enterprise: Some Aspects
of Japanese Commercial Law in LAv IN JAPAN 528-30 (Von Mehren ed. 1963);
YUNOKI, op. cit. .supra note 98, at 377-85; Mizushima, Kigy6 tampo (Enterprise
security) in MINJI HoEGAKU Jf'EN (Dictionary of civil jurisprudence) 318 (1960).
This was the first Japanese statute in which the "floating lien" idea was adopted. Its
conception of public notice in terms of the overall enterprise is unusual in Japan.
Although an "estate" or "foundation" hypothec (zaidan teit6) covering both land and
personalty has been made possible in several situations by special statutes providing for
blanket hypothecs, enacted after 1905 and designed to promote the development of
Japanese industry, these statutes have approached the problem of public notice in terms
of individual assets. The lender must "register," i.e., file with the relevant administra-
tive office, a document which lists the individual items of property. Omissions and
errors in the enumeration will enable third persons to defeat the lender's security
interest in the affected assets. Where the registration is properly accomplished, the
lender can recover personalty from a bona fide purchaser who took from the debtor.
This right, which a lender does not have in a jSto tanpo transaction (see the text
accompanying note 115 supra), is of course explained by the fact that registration and
the notice given by it changes the basic position of purchasers. Another striking
feature of zaidan teito is the inclusion in the enabling statutes of provisions prohibit-
ing alienation of the encumbered assets by the debtor, even for business purposes.
The zaidan teit statutes currently operative are: Factory Hypothecation Law(Koj6 teit6h5) (Law No. 54, 1905); Railway Hypothecation Law (Tetsud
teit~h6) (Law No. 53, 1905); Mining Hypothecation Law (Kagy6 teit5he) (Law
No. 55, 1905); Canal Law (Ungah6) art. 13 (Law No. 16, 1913); Fishery Estate
Hypothecation Law (Gyogy6 zaidan teitaho) (Law No. 9, 1925) ; Road Traffic Trans-
portation Enterprise Hypothecation Law (Daro k~tsa jigy6 teith6) (Law No. 204,
1952) ; Harbor Transport Business Activities Law (Kowan unsa jigyshc7) arts. 23-28
(Law No. 161, 1951) ; and Small-Gauge Railway Hypothecation Law (Kido no teit6
ni kansurn haritsu) (Law No. 28, 1909). 2 EHS 2180-series. For discussions of these
statutes, see WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 209-16; YuNoI, op. cit. supra
note 98, at 366-77; Michida, supra at 524-28. These writers call attention to the fact
that the aaidan teit5 legislation is not accomplishing its intended purpose. The statutes
are not often used and a major factor in their disuse is the very burdensome registra-
tion demand made by them. Also see Kat6, supra note 101. at 196.
123 SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 81, 82. Kat6, supra note 101, at 191.
So long as the security agreement provides for the loans which were in fact made, the
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Beginning in 1933 the Japanese Diet has enacted several statutes
which authorize the creation of hypothecs in specified types of mov-
ables, viz., farmers' equipment, motor vehicles, airplanes, and con-
struction machinery."' These special statutes follow the general
scheme of the Civil Code provisions dealing with hypothecs of im-
movables, both as to public notice and as to remedies.
Registration is required, and in a very burdensome way. The
amount125 and maturity of the debt, and the rate of interest, must be
stated. A separate registration certificate must be prepared and filed
for each chattel. A general notice phrased in terms of "all the collat-
eral" of a particular kind or type cannot be used, even in the instance
of farm equipment as to which it would be particularly helpful. Failure
to satisfy the registration demands means vulnerability to levying
creditors of the debtor, to his trustee in bankruptcy, and to his bona
fide transferee. In the case of farmers' equipment, the lender loses to a
bona fide taker from the debtor even though registration has been
accomplished, probably because a hypothec of this type often covers
small items as to which the burden of a record check would be exces-
sive.
The remedy imposed on the lender by these statutes is the procedure
provided by the Public Sales Law, which was discussed above at note
53 and which is far from an ideal realization method.
Although sound enough in its objectives, the hypothec legislation
for movables has not been a success. The main reason for its failure is
the registration requirement. Particularly objectionable is the demand
for the disclosure of interest rates and other debt details. Japanese
businessmen regard this information as confidential, as do many of
their opposite numbers in the United States.
Both because of the specialized nature of the transactions which are
covered, and because the hypothec statutes are not being used even
where they are available, this legislation has not displaced jito tampo
to any significant degree.
lender's security interest as against both the debtor and third persons is not vulnerable
even though the advances were "optional" rather than "mandatory."
124 The official statutory references are indicated in note 78 supra. These statutes
are discussed in WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 79, at 216-19; YuNoKI, op. cit. supra
note 98, at 360-62. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 848 provides for hypothecs in vessels but
vessels are treated under Japanese law as a type of immovable and are hence outside
the scope of this paper.
125 Although an amount must be stated, the figure which appears in the registration
notice need not be the sum then actually loaned. It can be a ceiling amount, as in the
instance of a future advance transaction. See YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 215-29.
[VOL. 39
PERSONAL PROPERTY AS .COLLATERAL
Trust Receipts*
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act is the context in which the Amer-
ican law governing this type of security will be examined.128 As to
goods, it requires delivery to the borrower ("trustee") from either the
lender ("entruster") or a third person. The delivery must be pursuant
to a financing arrangement which is restricted both in type and pur-
pose 12 Various other details, including public notice requirements,
are closely regulated. 2 This is a carefully drafted statute specifically
designed to facilitate the movement of goods in the channels of com-
* The authors acknowledge their thanks to Professor Sadatar5 Ikegald, Law
Faculty, Kansa University, for his suggestions and assistance in preparing the ma-
terial on trust receipts.
128 Under the U.C.C. a trust receipt has no special legal characteristics. The con-
mon-law trusts receipt has no significant commercial utility in the United States. The
American common law of trust receipts provides an interesting case history of an
attempt to develop a new and sui generis type of security. As the device gained some
currency in the United States during the early nineteen-twenties, it came increasingly
into litigation in which the key issue was the applicability of a chattel mortgage filing
statute. The documentation typically moved title from a seller of goods to a financing
lender while possession went to the buyer-borrower purportedly as a trust for the
lender. The borrower was usually authorized to sell or process the goods and was
obliged to account carefully for them or their proceeds. Freedom from both the filing
system and from chattel mortgage foreclosure statutes was part of the draftsman's
objective. Courts in increasing numbers saw a concealed chattel mortgage. The com-
mon law trust receipt appeared headed for oblivion when the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act was promulgated in 1933. See: the text accompanying notes 71, 72 supra; JONES,
CIATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 33c, d, e (6th ed. 1933) ; Frederick,
7he Trust Receipt as Security, 22 CoLum. L. Rnv. 395, 546 (1922); Hanna, Trust
Receipts, 29 CoLum. L. REV. 545 (1929); Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction, 5
FORDHIAm L. REV. 17, 240 (1936) ; Annot., 49 A.L.R. 282 (1927) ; Supp. 87 A.L.R. 302(1933), 101 A.L.R. 454 (1936), 168 A.L.R. 359 (1947).
127 A statutory trust receipt cannot be used by a seller to finance his own sale, or by
anyone to secure an old debt not incurred in connection with the financing of the same
goods, or to secure future advances. In the instance of goods, the financing must be for
the purpose of "manufacturing or processing the goods delivered or covered by the
documents, with the purpose of ultimate sale, or for the purpose of loading, unloading,
storing, shipping, trans-shipping, or otherwise dealing with them in a manner prelim-
inary to or necessary to their sale." Sections 1, 2(1), 2(3), 14.
12 8 The trust receipt must be in writing. Sections 2(1) (c) (i), 2(2). The en-
truster's remedies are basically those of a pledgee. The time and method of sale are
specified in the statute. Section 6. The public notice demands of the Act are simple.
A short form stating that the parties contemplate trust receipt financing involving an
indicated type of personalty is filed with a state official. This notice may be filed before
any trust receipt has been executed. Section 13. The entruster is protected against the
trustee's creditors for thirty days without filing but is thereafter vulnerable to a lien
creditor unless he files. Section 8. The entruster who does not file may lose the
property to a buyer not in ordinary course but will prevail over such a buyer if there
be filing. Section 9(2) (b). A buyer in ordinary course of trade takes free of the
entruster's interest, even though there be filing and even though the trust receipt
forbids sale. Section 9(2) (a). The entruster's rights in proceeds are spelled out with
care. Section 10. Concerning the operation of these provisions, see Bacon, supra note
126, at 240 et seq.; McGowAx, TRUST REcEIPSrs (1946). The usual trust receipt docu-
ment requires gross accounting by the debtor-trustee and hence presents no dominion
and control problem. Processing of the type which destroys the identity of the col-
lateral can raise questions for which there are no clear-cut answers. A transaction
involving this type of collateral may require a security arrangement in which a trust
receipt is used, if at all, in conjunction with another type of security.
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merce on a secured basis. In part its purpose is to provide answers
for some of the problems which plague users of mortgages in similar
business situations. Especially important are the entruster's legal inter-
est in proceeds and the assurance with which he can pre-file (i.e., file
ahead of a loan and a security transaction). The simplicity of the
document which goes to file is a further safeguard. It has few technical
details either in content or execution and leaves little opportunity for
the draftsman to make mistakes. These advantages are coupled to
flexible remedies. It is accordingly understandable that trust receipts
have gained wide use in domestic trade, especially in the financing of
the incoming inventory of automobile and appliance dealers, while
continuing to play an important part in the import trade. Experience
has been favorable in terms of disputes and litigation, favorable enough
in fact to induce several legislatures to broaden the permitted range of
financing to encompass certain types of goods which have previously
been delivered to the borrower."2 9
In Japan, the adaptability inherent in the concept of jito tampo as
essentially contractual has permitted the development of a security
arrangement (torasuto reshiito) which resembles the American stat-
utory trust receipt. 3 ° This device is used only in import transactions
and as a second stage in a financing sequence which commences with
a letter to credit.
In a typical Japanese letter of credit, the beneficiary is a foreign
seller of goods to be shipped under a negotiable title document. The
customer (importer) enters into an agreement with the issuer which
recites that the issuer shall be the owner of documents and goods, as
collateral security, with a power of sale. It is understood that the issuer
must account for any surplus and that the customer is liable for any
129 The uniform act has generated a surprisingly modest amount of appellate litiga-
tion. A few lenders have got into trouble by attempting to use trust receipts without
meeting the demand for delivery as part of the financing. In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp.
573 (1948) ; In re San Clemente Electric Supply, 101 F. Supp. 252 (1951). The
opinion in the former case suggests an unnecessary and unfortunate limitation of the
trust receipt to "acquisition" financing. The limitation would bar use of the trust
receipt as a second stage of a transaction which starts as a pledge of warehouse
receipts and of the goods they control. The Act contains no such limitation.
The 1957 amendment of REv. CODE WASH. § 61.20.020, discussed in Shattuck,
Security Transactions, Washington Legislation--1957, 32 WASH. L. REv. 208 (1957),
is typical of several in its authorization of trust receipts in goods previously delivered
to the debtor. It covers motor vehicles as do several similar statutes. It also covers
house trailers, boats, aircraft, and farm machinery.
130 IZAWA, SHOGYO SHINYOJO RON (Commercial letters of credit) 638 (1958)
Hamada, Nigawase (Documentary drafts) in MINJI HOGAKU JITEN (Dictionary of
civil jurisprudence) 1571 (1960) ; KoSAKA, BOEKI JITSUatU (Trading business) 335
(1962) ; ISHIDA, BoEKI SHOMU RON (Trading business) 402 (1960).
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deficiency. 1' It seems reasonably clear that the "ownership" of the
issuer is intended to be for security and "external" rather than "gen-
eral," and that the "internal" ownership is intended to reside in the
customer-debtor. Possession of the documents means possessory con-
trol both of documents and goods, and the correct analysis of the
issuer's security interest (after receiving the documents) is far from
obvious. Ownership in the issuer is incompatible with pledge. The
combination of debt and external ownership in the issuer for security
points toward jito tampo of the liberal variety and this is probably the
expectable judicial classification, although the transaction deviates
from the jito tampo norm in that the issuer also has possessory control.
In jurisdictions which do not have the U.C.C. an American issuer's
security interest presents a similar analytic problem.'32
An issuer which has honored a letter of credit will often be willing
to defer reimbursement by the customer until the goods have been
processed or sold, provided ample security in the goods can be given.
At this point a Japanese issuer (which will always be a bank) might
take a chattel-mortgage type of jdto tampo. For reasons which are not
clearly determinable, banks have chosen instead to use security agree-
ments which approximate in wording a typical American trust receipt.
The forms used are entitled "trust receipt" and that term has become a
part of the Japanese nomenclature. The agreement refers to the collat-
eral which the bank already has as an issuer, states that the bank shall
remain the "owner" of the collateral, and incorporates the letter of
credit indemnity agreements as to details (such as remedies provisions)
which are not otherwise covered. 33 Standing alone, these recitals
131 See Exhibit 9, Izawa, Sono & Shattuck, Letters of Credit in Japanese-United
States Trade, 38 WASH. L. Rxv. 169, 219 (1963).
132 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 541, 544; HAMADA, NIGAWASE (Documentary
drafts) 133, 165, 193, 194 (3 SoGo HAMREI XENKYU SOSHO SHoHO ed. 1961) ; WAGA-
TSUMA, KINDAI HO XI OKERU SAIXEN NO YUETSTJTEKI CEM (Superior position of
obligations in modem law) 139 (1962). The typical American trust receipt document
recites that the issuer shall be the "owner" of the documents and goods. It is assumed,
however, by banks and their customers that the legal relations are those of pledge.
There appears to be no decisive case authority clarifying the situation. Shattuck &
Guernsey, Letters of Credit-A Comparison of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Washington Practice, 37 WASH. L. Rv. 500, 533, nn. 126, 129, 536
(1962). U.C.C. § 9-102 (1) (a) states the coverage of secured transactions in person-
alty so broadly as to include the interest of an issuer. Compliance is, however, no
problem. Where possession is taken, no other formality is requisite to accomplishing
a security interest. Section 9-203(1), (2). Possession of negotiable documents per-
fects the secured party's interest in both documents and the goods represented by them.
Sections 9-304(2), 9-305.
133 See Exhibits 3 and 4. The bank's interest is not imperilled as to the debtor's
creditors when the the debtor takes possession under a trust receipt. See the discussion,
IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 538 et seq.
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would provide little ground for disputes about theory. An agreement,
an obligation to be secured, and ownership in the bank for security are
the basic elements of jdto tampo.'s4 The Japanese form, however, goes
on to recite that the debtor holds possession of and may sell the collat-
eral as "agent" for the bank." 5 This language, which was apparently
taken from the forms used by some early American entrusters, departs
both from the modern American recital of a holding in trust by the
debtor, and from the chattel-mortgage type of j4to tampo. It has
accordingly complicated the analysis of the over-all legal relations be-
tween the parties and has occasioned discussion among Japanese
scholars concerning the proper classification of the transaction. The
consensus now is that these are instances of jito tampo, because the
essence of the intended relationship is security rather than agency."
Since the agreement contemplates sale of the collateral for the benefit
of both parties as the bank's remedy if the debtor defaults, this is a
liberal variety of jito tampo.
Although a trust receipt as currently used in Japan is a secondary
stage of acquisition financing in which the debtor neither has nor has
ever had title to the goods, for the purpose of sale, transportation, or
storage, these details reflect business rather than legal criteria. In not-
able contrast with the restricted and technical elements of the Amer-
ican trust receipt, there is no legal demand that there be "delivery"
of the goods to the trustee as part of the financing, nor that the financ-
ing shall be for acquisition of the goods, nor that the financing shall be
for any particular kind of purpose."5 7
The fact that this device is used exclusively in import transactions
likewise reflects business rather than legal considerations. In domestic
trade, the great bulk of inventory moves to the buyer on open account.
134 WAGATSUMA, TAMPO BUKKENHO (Law of security interests) 230, 231 (3 Minmpo
K OI ed. 1955) ; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 400. The fact that the bank's
"ownership" came to it from a third person rather than from the debtor does not
affect the analysis.
135 Sale by the debtor is commonly (but not always) authorized. Cf. para. 2,
Exhibits 3 and 4. Transshipment and storage are routine purposes. Processing, as in
the case of raw materials, is not ordinarily within the contemplation of Japanese users
of trust receipts. Some raw materials which have been imported by manufacturers
under letters of credit are released by issuers, on trust receipts, but without expectation
that the bank can after processing enforce a security interest against the things
into which the raw materials have gone. See the discussion at note 145 infra.
136 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 640-45; WAGATSUMA, op. Cit. supra note 134,
at 231.
137 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 639-42. Existing inventory can theoretically
be taken as collateral under a trust receipt. A simple recital that the bank has title
suffices to create the necessary security ownership. Issues about "delivery" cannot
arise. Concerning comparable U.S. developments, see note 129 supra.
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If security is required, jito tampo of the title-retaining or chattel-mort-
gage type is used, not because a trust receipt would not be legally effec-
tive but because the practice has developed this way.'
Thanks to the absence of an inhibiting legal straightjacket, the Jap-
anese trust receipt is a very flexible security device. Much of the same
kind of flexibility is possible under the U.C.C., which makes but limited
formal and technical demands for the creation of security interests.
Documents labelled "trust receipt" and worded as before continue to
be used in U.C.C. states in the business situations in which trust re-
ceipts were previously used. Precisely the same legal results would,
of course, be achieved under a document bearing some other label and
containing no language about a "trust."
When the trust receipt stage of a financing transaction is reached,
a Japanese debtor's obligation will be embodied in a promissory note.
Pending its maturity the bank has the power to convey the goods to
another (as is indicated below at note 153) but not the right to do so.
Such a sale is a legal wrong for which the debtor can recover dam-
ages.' Where a trust receipt follows a letter of credit, the debtor's
note will replace and supersede his duty to reimburse under the letter
of credit. 4 ' When the note falls due, non-payment will be a default
for which the bank's remedy against the collateral will be under the
trust receipt. The bank can sell the goods at public or private sale
without notice to the debtor, and can be a buyer.'" The debtor is
entitled to a surplus and is liable for a deficiency. 42 Suit on the debt is
an alternative remedy in the first instance. Until the bank sells, the
debtor can redeem.4
Theoretically it would be possible for the parties to provide in the
trust receipt that on default the bank could become the absolute owner
by so electing (i.e., the parties could create "strict" jdto tampo).",
This is not, however, the practice.
Normal property principles operate to give the bank the ownership
138 At this time it seems unlikely that the agency provisions which are the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of a Japanese trust receipt will be deemed desirable or
necessary in domestic trade situations.
139 IzAvA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 638, 648. See the discussion at note 107 supra.
1 40 As to the reimbursement obligation of the customer in a letter of credit trans-
action see para. 4, Exhibit 5, Izawa, Sono & Shattuck, supra note 131, at 214.
141 IzAwA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 647. See the text accompanying note 110 supra.
142 IzAwA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 643, 647. Also see the text accompanying note
110 supra.
143 IZAwA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 647. Also see the text accompanying note 111
supra.
1" IzAwA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 647; WAGATSUmA, op. cit. supra note 134, at
234; Hamagami, supra note 98 at 980. See the text accompanying note 103 supra.
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of things which become part of the goods by accession14 and agency
principles regulate its relation to proceeds. A debtor who holds and
sells does so as agent and hence as a fiduciary. Proceeds and things
acquired with proceeds (such as replacement goods) are therefore held
in trust for the bank. 4 ' The usual trust receipt requires the debtor to
maintain insurance with loss payable to the bank. 7 Even without such
a provision the bank would have a measure of protection. It could
145 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 643; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 396.
Also of interest are some principles akin to the American doctrines of accession by
added labor, confusion, and merger. Adjunction (fugS) occurs where two or more
material things are joined together so as to make up a single entity. If movables
belonging to different owners are so joined that they cannot be separated without
damage, or if the separation would entail disproportionate expense, the ownership of
the composite thing vests in the owner of the principal movable. CIVIL CODE art. 243.
Which is the principal and which is the accessory thing must normally be determined
by the nature of the things rather than by their respective values. If this standard
proves to be unworkable, the parties become joint owners, in proportions measured by
the values of the parts contributed. CIVIL CODE art. 244. Mixture (kond3) occurs when
dry things such as grain (kongo) or liquids (yftwa) are combined. When things
belonging to different owners are mixed, CIVIL CODE art. 245 provides that article 243
governs if there be principal and accessory things, and article 244 governs otherwise.
Application of work (kako) occurs where a movable is transformed by labor into a
different or more valuable thing. Usually, the owner of the original movable owns the
final form, but if the value of the work greatly exceeds the value of the material,
the workman owns it. CIVIL CODE art. 246(1). If the workman supplies part of the
material, he owns the final form of the thing where the value of the work and the
value of his material exceeds the value of the other material. CIVIL CODE art. 246(2).
(Professor Wagatsuma deems these adjunction provisions to be variable by agree-
ment; WAGATSURA, op. cit. supra note 132, at 161-63.) Article 248 provides that a
person who suffers loss in the application of the foregoing principles can claim com-
pensation under articles 703 and 704, which deal with unjust enrichment. A person
who in bad faith brings about adjunction, mixture, or the application of work is liable
to restore the benefit received with interest and pay damages. A person who acted in
good faith is liable to make restitution only for the actual increment received.
146 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 644. See also WAGATSUIMA, op. Cit. supra note
134, at 231; SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 249; Hamagami, supra note 98 at
980. The relationships discussed at note 145 may be of interest in connection with pro-
ceeds. If the bank cannot trace and identify the proceeds the trust will of course fail,
as is true in the United States. There appears to be no alternative theory or analysis
which will aid the bank as to unidentifiable proceeds. Japanese law has no principle
comparable to U.C.C. § 9-306(4) and Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 10, which purport
to create a limited preferential position in the estate of an insolvent debtor, for a
claimant who has a right to proceeds but cannot identify them. Whether § 10 of the
Trust Receipts Act is operative in proceedings under the Federal Bankruptcy Act is
mooted; there are conflicting decisions. Cf. In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 862
(1955), noted 69 HARv. L. REv. 1343 (1956), and In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272
F.2d 224 (1959), noted 58 MicH. L. REV. 783 (1960). See also note 163 inlra. CIVIL
CODE art. 304 may pose a further problem. This article provides that a holder of a
charging lien (sakitoritokken) must impress his interest on unidentifiable proceeds
before they reach the debtor. (Although the article refers to "money or other things"
it is the consensus of scholars that it is aimed at unidentifiable assets.) Whether
article 304 states a basic principle which will apply to other types of security, such as
joto tainpo, is not clear. YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 98, at 397. Especially debatable
is the application of article 304 to trust receipts, in which the debtor occupies a repre-
sentative capacity.
Concerning the bank's relation to persons who acquire proceeds from the debtor, see
the discussion at note 161 infra.
147 Para. 8, Exhibit 3.
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reach the proceeds of any insurance taken by the debtor, as a substitute
collateral." 8
Possession of the goods by the debtor is so much an integral part of
a trust receipt transaction that an agreement which lacked this element
would not as a matter of definition be a trust receipt. From the debtor's
point of view, the objective of the financing is that he shall obtain the
goods in order that they can be sold, either currently or after processing
or a period of storage.
In legal analysis, however, the possessory part of the transaction is
a bailment governed by the Civil and Commercial Codes.' These
place on a bailee the duties of a "good manager" and give him a right
to reimbursement for expenses necessarily incurred in protecting the
goods. The latter provision would operate for the benefit of the debtor
if the bank wrongfully sold the goods or its creditors seized them (see
the following paragraph) but otherwise yields to a contrary agree-
ment. The typical trust receipt form expressly shifts certain types of
expense to the debtor. 5 ' Apart from such a provision, the security
nature of the bank's position as bailor adequately demonstrates an
implied understanding that the debtor will bear all expenses relating
to the goods. 1' Correlatively, the debtor expects to remain in posses-
sion pending sale of the goods or maturity of his obligation. If he does
not misconduct himself in regard to the goods, this expectation is
normally borne out in experience. On the legal side, however, his
possessory right is a limited one. The bailment is terminable at the will
of the bank. 2
A person who buys from a debtor authorized to sell will, of course,
take a good title in Japan, but the legal position of other types of third
persons is adjusted by Japanese law in ways different either in ap-
proach or result from American law. The bank has the power to trans-
fer good title, either before or after maturity of the secured debt, and
148 Doi v. M6ri, 12 Minshdi 2680, 2683 (Sup. Ct, Dec. 19, 1933). See also the
references cited at note 146 supra, and SHIoxiyA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 107-14.
.49 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 644; CIvIL CODE art. 665 (which refers to arts.
646-50) ; CommERc L CODE art. 593.
3--0 Para. 3, Exhibit 3; Para. 5, Exhibit 4.
151 IzAwA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 645; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134, at
233; SHixomrYA, op. cit. supra note 103, at 60, 137-40; Hamagami, Joto tampo in
MNxJI IHOGAKU JITEN (Dictionary of civil jurisprudence) 980 (1960).
152 CIvIL CODE art. 662 provides that a bailor can claim a return of the goods at any
time even though the bailment-agreement fixes a term. Moreover, the typical trust
receipt expressly provides that the entruster shall have possession at his will. Para. 6,
Exhibit 3. See also IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 644. But see the text accom-
panying note 104 supra.
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without regard to the bona fides of the buyer.'53 Its creditors can reach
the goods by process"' and its liquidator in bankruptcy takes the goods
free of the debtor's interest.' If a general creditor of the debtor levies
on the goods the bank can totally defeat the levy."' If the debtor be-
comes a bankrupt the goods are not included in the asset inventory of
his estate.'57 These results follow logically from the external ownership
obtained by the bank through the contract. The developing school of
scholarly thought critical of jito tampo analyses which take insuffi-
cient cognizance of the essentially security nature of the transaction is
concerned about trust receipts as well as about other kinds of j6to
tampo. Especially criticized is the power of the secured party's
creditors and liquidator to seize the goods in derogation of the debtor's
rights.'58 There appears to be no evidence so far that Japanese courts
will be persuaded by the criticism. 55
1'3 IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 648; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134, at
235; YUNOKI, TAMPO BUKKENHO (Law of security interests) 392 (19 HORITSUGAKU
ZENSHU ed. 1959) ; Hamagami, supra note 151, at 981. But see discussion in SHINO-
2,1IYA, JOTO TAMPO 196-200 (17 SOGO HANREI KENKYU sosHo MIiPo ed. 1962).
Section 6(1) (c) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act protects a buyer from the
entruster in the instance of a wrongful sale, but only if the buyer takes for value and
in good faith. The U.C.C. provides, as to a sale made after the debtor has defaulted,
that a good faith buyer at a private sale takes free of the debtor's interest, and that a
buyer at a public sale who neither colludes with the secured party or other persons
nor knows of defects in the sale likewise takes free of the debtor's interest. Section
9-504(4).
'54 See IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 648; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134,
at 235; YUNOKI, op. cit. mipra note 153, at 393.
'55 Bankruptcy Law (Hasanho) art. 88 (Law No. 71, 1922) ; IZAWA, op. cit. supra
note 130, at 648; WAGATSUNIA, op. cit. supra note 134, at 235; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra
note 153, at 393; Hamagami, supra note 151, at 981. See also the text accompanying
notes 99, 119 supra.
156 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 549. IZAWA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 648; WAGA-
TSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134, at 235; YUNOKI, op. cit. iupra note 153, at 393;
Hamagami, supra note 151, at 981; Hida v. Kume, 20 Minroku 865, 872 (Sup. Ct.,
Nov. 2, 1914). See also Professor Mikazuki's report in the symposium, note 118
supra, at 3; the statement by Mr. Ishida, supra at 28, and the discussion at note
158 infra. Although a judgment creditor of the debtor cannot seize the property and
sell it subject to the jto tampo, he can achieve the same general result by levying on
the redemption right as an intangible and combining a proffer of payment to the
secured party at maturity with a simultaneous levy on the property.
157 Bankruptcy Law (HasanhJ) art. 87 (Law No. 71, 1922) ; IZAWA, op. cit. supra
note 130, at 648; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134, at 235; YuNoxu, op. cit. supra
note 153, at 393.
158 See the text accompanying notes 107, 119 supra. Professor Kaneko has argued
with much force that upon a pleading by the security-giver that the security-holder
had only a security ownership, the attacking creditor or liquidator must restrict his
claim to the preferential-payment right of the security-holder. KANEKO, KYosEi
SHIKKOHO (Execution law) 64 (1961). See also SHINOMIYA, op. cit. supra note 153,
at 204-17; Onoki, J6to tainpo to sashiosae, 36 HOGAKU RONSO (Kyoto University L.
Rev.) 1144 (1937), and the symposium cited in note 118 supra at 4. This problem is,
of course, not acute in trust receipt transactions because in current practice the en-
truster is always a bank and not apt to be the subject of either process or liquidation.
l.'9 See the statement of Professor Yunoki in the symposium cited in note 118 supra
at 19. The theoretic significance of the 1959 tax statute which enables the government,
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An unauthorized sale by the debtor and a subsequent pledge or
security transfer by him will fall within the general principle of Civil
Code article 192, which protects one who takes in good faith and
without negligence from a person in possession."' The bank cannot
escape article 192 by either drafting or filing. Like results follow if
the debtor wrongfully transfers proceeds, whether chattels taken in
trade, checks, notes or conditional sale contracts. 1 ' It is not likely
that a stock certificate will be received as a proceed. If this should
happen and the debtor wrongfully transfers it, the buyer would be
under certain circumstances, to seize goods in the hands of a security holder for unpaid
taxes of the debtor, was discussed at note 119 supra.
16oAs to documents of title the relevant coverage is in CommERac AL CoDE art. 519,
which requires bona fides and an absence of "gross negligence." The burden of proof
under this article is on the secured party. The comparable chattel mortgage problem
was discussed at notes 95, 115 .npra. It will be observed that the principle applies
indifferently to the various types of ioto tampo, to buyers in ordinary course, and to
buyers not in ordinary course (i.e., bulk buyers). It may be expected, however, that
the latter will have difficulty in meeting the "good faith without negligence" standard
unless some investigation of the buyer's right to sell has been made. Such an investiga-
tion would usually disclose the existence of the trust receipt. Under § 9(1) (a) of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act, a bona fide purchaser for value of negotiable paper or
of an instrument which, although not negotiable, is "by common practice purchased and
sold as if negotiable" takes free of the entruster's interest. The "value" requirement is
not found in Japanese law in comparable situations. The Japanese concept of "good
faith" is strictly concerned with "notice" or "knowledge." This does not necessarily
mean that different end results are expectable in the two legal systems as to purchasers
of entrusted instruments or documents. Buried in the evidentiary aspects of "negli-
gence" are ideas which can penalize one who takes as a gift or upon an unequal
exchange of monetary values. Failure to investigate can be negligence. Suspicion of
the "gift horse" will often be rational, and may demand investigation which would
disclose the title defect.
In practice, fraudulent sales by Japanese debtors are so rare as to pose no practical
impediment to the use of trust receipts. In sales by the debtor the full impact of the
agency theory which Japanese banks incorporate into their trust receipts is felt. The
bank is probably a principal and liable as such for breaches of warranty as well for
breach of contract, whether the agency be disclosed or not disclosed by the debtor.
Correlatively, the debtor who discloses his agency is probably not liable to the buyer
for either breach of contract or breach of warranty. Lack of disclosure will, of course,
make the debtor personally liable. As to these details CommEciL CODE art. 504 is in
point. Liability of the bank for breaches of warranty seems particularly undesirable.
Whether a shift in theory to "trust" would resolve the difficulty is debatable. Concern-
ing the approach of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act to this problem see the discussion
at note 128 .supra and §§ 9(2) (b) and 12. The latter section denies the liability of an
entruster as principal or as vendor under a sale or contract to sell made by the trustee-
debtor, even though sale was expressly authorized. So does the U.C.C. which provides
in § 9-317: "The mere existence of a security interest or authority given to the debtor
to dispose of or use collateral does not impose contract or tort liability upon the
secured party for the debtor's acts or omissions."
101 CIM CODE art. 192 will cover trade-ins. Law on Checks (Kogitteh6) art. 21
(Law No. 57, 1933) governs checks. Law on Bills (Tegataho) arts. 16(2), 77 (Law
No. 20, 1932) apply to notes and bills of exchange, secured or otherwise. "Proceeds"
may encompass the fruits of a secured-credit sale. Conditional sales (i.e., ijto tampo,
retained-title type) may or may not be accompanied by a note. If not, the assignee
comes under Civ CoDE art. 192. A bona fide taker of cash proceeds will prevail but
the reason is disputed. See WAGATSumA, BUKxENHO (Law of real rights) 145, 146
(2 M mpo iKoci ed. 1955) ; Suzuxr, op. cit. supra note 115, at 149-53.
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protected.' Save for negotiable types, the American law gives the
entruster a considerably greater degree of protection in proceeds. 3
The concern of Japanese scholars with j6to tampo public-notice
problems has already been mentioned."" If legislation comes it will
probably be framed in terms of all jito tampo transactions, including
trust receipts.
Seller's Lien
Under the Uniform Sales Act, if his buyer becomes insolvent an
unpaid seller who still has possession of the goods can abrogate a
credit term in the sales contract, withhold delivery, retake title (if
title has passed), and recover damages if the buyer does not come
forward with the purchase price, in cash, within a reasonable time."6 5
This array of rights and remedies is called a "seller's lien," but the
name is not entirely apt. If there be a lien it is a possessory one only.
The U.C.C. has retained the Sales Act ideas, but has dropped the
term "lien" and has extended the seller's protection to include a
limited right of reclamation after delivery. 6' An unpaid seller has
under Japanese law a "preferential right" which survives delivery
and would accordingly seem to have potential as a kind of purchase-
162 See para. 5 of Exhibit 3 and COmMERCIAL CODE art. 229.
163 Under § 9 (1) (b) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the interest of the en-
truster in proceeds will be lost if the proceeds are negotiable paper or an instrument
bought and sold as negotiable, and reach a bona fide purchaser for value. U.C.C. §
9-309 produces the same results.
As to non-negotiable types of proceeds, § 10 of the Act accords priority in identifiable
proceeds "to the extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom his
security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the trustee." This is also the
basic position of U.C.C. § 9-306. Both of these statutes state a limited advantage for
a secured party in the general assets of an insolvent debtor, as to unidentifiable proceeds
received during the ten days preceding the institution of insolvency proceeding.
Whether the Uniform Trust Receipts Act provision is operative bankruptcy is disputed.
See note 146 supra.
164 See note 118 supra.
165 Sections 54, 62, 63. See also WILLISrON, SALES §§ 502-07 (rev. ed. 1948).
166 Section 2-702 provides: "(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent
he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore
delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (§ 2-705). (2)
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insol-
vent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt,
but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing
within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as
provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the
buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
Article (§ 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with
respect to them."
A contract term purporting to reserve title after delivery creates a security interest
which is regulated by Article 9 of the U.C.C. §§ 2-401 (1), 1-201(37), 9-102(1), (2).
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money-security-device. It falls well short of that utility, however,
because of Civil Code provisions subordinating his interest to various
interests subsequently created by the buyer.' In neither country is
there a convenient non-consensual relationship under which goods
can move into the hands of a credit buyer from an unpaid seller who
expects to be secured by the goods.
Conditional Sale
In both countries a sales contract plus bailment (the buyer being
the bailee and the title-retaining seller the bailor) is the consensual
security arrangement most commonly used by a seller. It is known in
the United States as a conditional sale and in Japan as shoyiiken ryfiho
(reservation of title).
By the time the U.C.C. appeared, the American law of conditional
sales varied widely from state to state. Some jurisdictions operated
under the common law, some under a combination of filing statute and
common law, and some under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
Public notice through filing is required in most but not all non-U.C.C.
states and is in general demanded by the U.C.C. A vendor who
perfects his security, by whatever method the jurisdiction requires,
will be prior to creditors and liquidators of the buyer and will, in
general, be prior to the buyer's successors." 8 The property can be
167 The seller's interest is prior to that of a levying creditor of the buyer. CMvn
CODE arts. 303, 311, 322. It is prior to that of the buyer's liquidator in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Law (Hasanha) art. 92 (Law No. 71, 1922). But the seller probably can-
not repossess the goods and must find his remedy in the complicated public sale pro-
cedures provided by the Public Sales Law (Keibaihi) (Law No. 15, 1898). The most
serious defect in his position is his vulnerability to subsequently created interests. A
purchaser from the buyer, whether or not in good faith, will exclude the seller entirely.
CIViL CODE arts. 333, 183; Kawai v. Nemoto, 23 Minroku 1203, 1209 (Sup. Ct., July 26,
1917) ; WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 134, at 63; YuNOKi, op. cit. supra note 153,
at 67. So will a subsequent encumbrancer. A pledgee's priority is expressly stated in
CIVIL CODE art. 334. The priority of a joto tampo taker follows from the fact that he
acquires general ownership and is accordingly a "purchaser." An artisan's lien for
preservation work done without actual knowledge of the seller's interest is prior under
Crvn. CODE art. 330.
168 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 506-13 (rev. ed.
1940); JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 1004-56 (6th ed.
1933) ; WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 165, §§ 324-27a. The U.C.C. § 9-302(1) re-
quires filing in order to perfect a conditional-sale type of security, save for consumer
goods other than fixtures or motor vehicles and some kinds of farm equipment. Section
9-302(1). The practical operation of the exemption is much narrowed by § 9-307(2),
which gives priority in such assets to a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and
for his own use, if the secured party has not filed. It follows that there is considerable
pressure on the conditional vendor to file, and many of such transactions are being
protected by filing in U.C.C. states.
Conditional sales are not often used to finance a merchant's inventory. If the ar-
rangement is used, the principles discussed at note 95 supra, including U.C.C. § 9-
307(l), will protect a buyer in ordinary course from the vendee.
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taken by the vendor from a defaulting buyer but interference with
the possession of a buyer not in default is a conversion. Rightful
retaking will in some states extinguish the buyer's duty to pay while
in others the property can be sold and a deficiency recovered if sale-
proceeds are less than the debt-balance. 6 ' In some states a repossess-
ing seller can retain all of the buyer's payments. In others he must
account for payments made, less use value. In still others he must
sell and account for a surplus above the unpaid debt-balance."'
Despite these variations, which make the nationwide picture a highly
confused one, a conditional sale contract carefully tailored to the law
of the state in which it is employed has proved to be a useful and
safe kind of security device. It continues in general use in states
which have enacted the U.C.C. even though its legal incidents in such
states will not differ from those of other types of security agreements.
Notably, under the U.C.C. there is no forced election between repos-
session and suit for the price, and no forfeiture of the buyer's equity.'
Installment selling on a secured basis is a relatively new element in
the Japanese economy and one for which there was, until recently,
neither Code nor special-statute coverage. When legislation came it
was regulatory rather than declaratory of the seller's security interest,
as will be indicated below.
Meanwhile the ubiquitous jito tampo again provided a contractual
framework within which a considerable degree of refinement in install-
ment-selling documentation has been achieved. These transactions
rest on the assumption that a seller's retained general ownership
functions as does the general ownership acquired by a lender. The
assumption seems justified,'72 although helpful appellate decisions
have not appeared.
169 GLENN, op. cit. supra note 168, §§ 513-15; WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 165,
§§ 571, 579-79h. Pending his default the buyer's possession cannot rightfully be
disturbed by the seller. As against third persons the buyer has the normal rights and
remedies of a bailee.
17o WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 165, § 579c; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 736 at 483
et seq. (3d ed. 1961).
171 The seller can repossess under § 9-503 and is required by § 9-505(1) to sell the
collateral save for the limited exceptions stated in § 9-505 (2). He can recover a
deficiency and must account for a surplus. Section 9-504(1), (2).
172 BRAUCHER & MICHIDA, 2 AMERIKA SHOTORIHIKIHO TO NIHON MINSHOHO
("American Law on Commercial Transactions and the Japanese Civil and Commercial
Codes") 371 (1961) ; Kat6, supra note 100, at 190, 192; INAMURA, KAPPU HAIBAI(Installment sales) 30, 31 (1961) ; Kaji, Kappu hainbai no horitsu (Law of install-
ment sales), KAPPU HAMBAI NO HORITSU KAIKEI ZEIMU (Law and accounting of
installment sales) 144-146 (Shinada ed. 1961); Tanaka, Kappu hambai keiyaku no
ichi k~satsu (A survey of installment sales contracts), KIGYOHO KENKYU (Journal
of enterprise law) (No. 103) 4, 5 (1963). See also article 7 of the Installment Sales
Law, cited at note 177 infra. The traditional term in installment sales transactions is
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In this variety of jito tampo most of the distinguishing character-
istics of the agreement resemble those of the common law conditional
sale-titie is to pass if and when the price is fully paid; the buyer's
contract and possessory rights are contingent on his non-default;
default on even one installment gives the seller a right to repossess
and to retain all payments made by the debtor (as rental rather than
as liquidated damages). There is, however, no legal requirement that
the vendor elect between repossession and recovery of the debt balance,
this being a detail which the parties can fix by agreement. Repos-
session by peaceful self-help is not unlawful and a typical document
will authorize this method."' The substantive relationships in this
variety of liberal jito tampo do not otherwise differ from those indi-
cated in the discussion of chattel mortgages and trust receipts.
Financing charges for the privilege of paying in installments are
variously handled. Some dealers will quote two prices, one a cash
price and the other a time price; the difference is apt to work out
at about 16% when translated into interest terms. The actual differ-
ence is often greater. Cash buyers may be able to chaffer and to buy
at well below the quoted cash price. Discounts of 20% to 30% are
not unknown. These practices are most often encountered in the
retailing of household goods and household appliances. In other situa-
tions, and especially in the automobile trade, the dealer states a list
price which is in effect a cash price. A time buyer will be required to
pay in addition a carrying charge of the type familiar to some millions
of American car buyers. This too will average around 16% in terms
of interest,"4 save for buyers of high credit rating whose paper can
be discounted by the dealer to a bank. Japan has a usury law but the
idea that a time-price differential is not interest obtains there as it
does in most of the United States."' So does the idea that a carrying
shoyaken ryaho (reservation of title) rather than jisto tainpo. But the legal relations
are those of f5to tam po. See the discussion at notes 101, 134 supra.
173 BRAUCHER & MicHiDA, op. cit. supra note 172, at 429. Some Japanese self-help
clauses purport to authorize trespass to persons or land in the repossession process.
The legality of such clauses is doubtful, although definitive decisions have not yet
appeared in Japan. Clauses like these are in general void in the United States, as to
trespass to persons. The trespass to land cases divide. Comment, Limitations on the
Use of Force in Repossession of Chattels Sold Under Conditional Sales Contracts, 36
Go. L.J. 218 (1948).
174 Fifteen to sixteen percent is the normal range (i.e., 7y2 or 8% of a total unpaid
price which is repayable in twelve monthly installments). Ordinary secured bank loans
carry 7% to 9% interest, including notes secured by retained-title sale-security jdto
tampo and taken by the bank from the originating dealer. See notes 67, 68 supra.
175 BRAucHER & MICHIDA, op. cit. supra note 172, at 432. As to the situation in the
United States see: Annot., 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943); Berger, Usury in Installment
Sales, 2 LAw & CoNTEmT. PRo. 148 (1935) ; Note, Usury Statutes; Their Applica-
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charge is a kind of time-price differential. Competitive factors are
stabilizing conditional sale credit charges and there seems to be no
likelihood that rates will get higher. Excessive pricing in all manner
of sale transactions involving goods is forbidden by a special statute,'76
but there does not appear to have been any instance in which it has
been judicially applied to a time-price differential.
In 1961 the Japanese Diet enacted its first installment sale statute.
Many of the details7 8 resemble those of comparable consumer pro-
tection legislation now being widely enacted in the United States. 9
Some of the American statutes regulate credit charges. The Japanese
law does not.
CONCLUSION
The main themes running through Japanese chattel-security law
are those to be observed in the Codes and the special hypothec statutes,
bility to the Credit Sale Followed by an Assignment to a Lending Agency, 43 IOWA L.
REV. 87 (1957) ; Note, Installment Sales Financing-Usury-Difference Between Time
Price and Cash Price in a Conditional Sale Contract Is Interest and Subject to the
Usury Laws, 32 FORDHAm L. REV. 587 (1964).
176 Excessive Profit Regulation Ordinance (Bukka tseirei) (Ordinance No. 118,
1946). A nonconforming contract would be void under CIVIL CODE art. 90.
177 Installment Sales Law (Kappu hainbailho) (Law No. 159, 1961). The precise
scope of this statute is not entirely clear. It refers generally to "installment sales" but
goes on to state in article 7 a presumption that the seller retains title in an installment
sale until he is fully paid. That this passage is intended to limit the coverage of the
statute to transactions in which title is retained is doubtful. Arguably the presumption
stated is rebuttable and a seller is bound by the regulatory sections even though he
puts title in the buyer on an unsecured basis. Certainly the purpose of the statute
cannot be accomplished if its operation can be escaped by putting title in the buyer and
taking back a chattel mortgage type of security. Japanese courts would probably con-
strue the statute as applying broadly to installment sales, however secured. Article 7
can be explained as inserted to protect sellers who fail to expressly include a security
provision in the sales agreement.
178 The main features are these: the seller must give twenty days' written notice
before cancelling the contract and contrary clauses are void (art. 5) ; a repossessing
seller can recover no more than the deficiency between contract price and worth of the
repossessed goods (art. 6); a seller who cannot or does not recover the goods can
recover the unpaid contract balance (art. 6) ; a copy of the contract in writing must
be given to the buyer (art. 4). As to the details of this statute and for a general
practical discussion of installment sales, see Kaji, supra note 172, at 63-235.
179 See, e.g., REV. CODE WASH. ch. 63.14. These statutes are discussed in Hogan,
A Survey of Retail Installment Financing, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958) ; Warren,
Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installnent Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 859 (1959).
The California statute is examined in detail in Comment, Legislative Regulation of
Retail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 623 (1960). Cases construing
statutes of this type in relation to automobile financing are gathered in Annot., 73
A.L.R. 2d 1430 (1960). Parallel common law developments in the buyer-protection
area are taking place. An increasing number of courts are refusing to treat finance
company transferees of notes given by conditional sale buyers as holders in due course,
and the traditional view of carrying charges as a time-price differential rather than
interest (i.e., usury; see note 175 supra) is coming under more critical examination.
See Consuner Credit Symposium: Developments in the Law, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 30
et seq. (1960). As the cited discussions indicate, in a few states the installment sales
statute regulates time-price differentials.
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and those which are manifested in jito tampo. The Code theme is
essentially restrictive. That of the special statutes is limited tolerance.
TJto tampo is a free-wheeling application of contract principles to
property security problems, which for the most part finds its legal
support only in decisions.
The Codes make a wholly inadequate contribution to the develop-
ment of commercially feasible security arrangements. Although the
Civil Code does a reasonably adequate job for possessory security and
security assignments of intangibles, it makes no practicable provision
for security in movables left in the debtor's hands. Indeed, article 192
in protecting a bona fide non-negligent purchaser from a person in
possession creates a direct and drastic impediment to the creation of
non-possessory security. The Commercial Code ignores personal prop-
erty security, save for a few sections on pledges.
Special hypothec legislation for movables has not succeeded in filling
the gaps left by the Codes. The statutes are inherently unattractive
to the business community by reason of the excessively rigorous public
notice demands and because of the requirement that realization be
pursued under the Public Sales Law. Apart from these details, a
piece-meal attack of this kind, in which particular kinds of personal
property are singled out for special treatment, seems foredoomed.
What is needed is a sensible security system geared to all kinds of
movables.
The substantive pledge coverage of the Civil Code is in general
excellent but the pledgee like the secured party in a statutory hypothec
of movables, is accorded insufficient leeway in realization methods.
Any system of collateral liquidation which demands a cash sale by
public auction is bound to work inefficiently. The obvious justification
for requiring sale by a public official is that the debtor is accorded
some needed protection. Even this laudable objective is not being
realized in practice because many of the sales conducted under the
Public Sales Law are controlled by entrepreneurs whose hired bidders
dominate the proceeding and restrain bidding. It would seem on
balance that the debtor would be better served in a fair sale handled
by the secured party and experience with jito tampo is building up
significant and apparently favorable data on lender-controlled sales.
Lenders also have a stake in realization procedures and the Public
Sales Law does not accord them sufficient assurance that the maximum
will be realized from the collateral. Experience in the United States
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demonstrates that the interests of both parties are best safeguarded
by legal principles which permit lenders a wide range of discretion at
the point of realization and which police the exercise of that discretion.
Judicial restraints of the kind developed by American courts may or
may not be practicable in Japan, as a policing technique. If not, some
other control method can certainly be found.
That jito tampo should have appeared in Japan is only expectable.
That it has survived is a remarkable demonstration of the inherent
vitality of customary law under codes as rigidly constructed as are
the Civil and Commercial Codes of Japan. It would seem, however,
that the point has been reached at which the uncertainties inevitable
in the situation, uncertainties the seriousness of which is accentuated
by the intellectual unease induced by conflicts between basic Code
concepts and what is actually being done, are becoming intolerable.
JMto tampo has the kind of potential for trouble which exists in the
United States when a court grounds a commercially important and
recurring relationship on a patent fiction. It is not possible for the
interested parties to be sure that the court will not re-examine its
position.
In both pledge and jito tampo transactions, the corrective which
would seem to an American observer to be most obviously desirable is a
reorientation of the principles regulating the position of third persons.
Some workable methods can surely be devised which will both protect
the debtor against loss of his interest to a levying creditor or liquidator
of the secured party or in a sale by the secured party at a time when
the debtor is not in default, and also protect the secured party in the
instance of unauthorized sale of non-negotiable collateral, not in the
ordinary course of business, by a debtor left in possession. Protection
of the debtor's general creditors seems also a worthwhile objective.
There are items to be entered on the asset side of the Japanese
ledger. In jdto tampo they have developed a concept of security which
is in some of its aspects an advance accomplished in the United States
only by the U.C.C. Freedom of the parties to fix the details of their
transaction as the business situation dictates is certainly a desideratum
of an ideal security system. Restraint of the occasional unscrupulous
lender is also a necessary part of such a system. The Chancellor's
intervention in Anglo-American pledge and mortgage transactions,
beneficial though it was, left a kind of schizophrenia. There has been
a continual struggle between the property aspects of these trans-
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actions, and their contract aspects. American courts have fixed the
drafting margins at diverse points but all agree that the debtor's
"equity of redemption" is incompatible with full freedom of contract.
Some states have put an analogous limitation on conditional sales, by
a requirement that the vendor elect between repossession and en-
forcement of the promise to pay. Trust receipts are much circum-
scribed by the uniform statute. One obvious end-product of these
developments was a need for further efforts to find the best solution for
the basic problems. Fortunately for the future progress of American
commercial law the work was done. The U.C.C. is the result. The
keystone of Article 9 is a contract conception of personal property
security.18
Another Japanese asset of great value is the nationwide operation
of security transaction principles. This is an advantage which is only
now being substantially achieved in the United States with enactment
of the U.C.C. More uniformity in the law of this area is long past due.
By the mid-twentieth century, generations of American legislators
and judges had built for the then forty-eight states an array of personal
property security principles which comprised, in gross, about as un-
national a body of law as could be accomplished in one nation. Since
mores differ both in time and in space and there are bound to be
vagaries in the application of intellect to problems, complete uniformity
in a broad area of state law can probably never be achieved in the
United States. The U.C.C. appears likely to come as close as can be
to a unitary system of security law.
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180 For a general discussion of U.C.C. Article 9 and freedom of contract, see King,
Policy Decisions and Security Agreements Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 9
WAYxE L. REv. 556 (1963). Several U.C.C. sections are directly relevant. U.C.C.§ 9-201(1) reads: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is
effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral
and against creditors... "' Under § 9-501 (1) the secured party has agreed-on remedies,
with certain exceptions stated in § 9-501(3). Section 1-102(3) is also relevant here.
It provides: "The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable." Implicit in the limitations on drafting indicated above is protection for
the debtor. Third persons who deal with the debtor are protected amply, some by
filing, others by priorities.
Is' The unitary-system objective of the U.C.C. can be defeated by divergent con-
struction or application of the statute and the risks will be compounded by blind adher-
ence to stare decisis. See Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 531
(1963). Professor Hawldand suggests that in construing the U.C.C. courts should:
"(1) use analogy rather than 'outside law' to fill Code gaps; (2) rely somewhat more
heavily on the decisions of other Code states in making their own decisions; and (3)
give their own decisions somewhat less permanent precedential value." A particularly
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The impressive roster of defects and inadequacies which charac-
terize the American law of personal property security apart from the
U.C.C. has been considerably reduced by that statute. Financing and
business operations under the U.C.C. can be conducted with certainty,
precision, and simplicity impossible in non-U.C.C. states and
impossible at this time in Japan. The U.C.C. also strikes a carefully
contrived and fair balance between the interests of the immediate
parties, and between their interests and those of persons who deal with
one of them.
Improvement of Japanese law in this area would seem best ac-
complished by something resembling Article 9 of the U.C.C. in scope
and approach; in other words, by a full-scale legislative attack on
personal property security problems of all kinds. The basic research
and planning which would of necessity precede the drafting of a
comprehensive statute might come from a legislative committee or
from a governmental agency. There does not appear to be any sub-
stantial prospect that private organizations will or could undertake
such a burden.
disturbing development is the insistence of some legislatures on departures from the
official text of the U.C.C. in their enactment of the statute. The extent of these devia-
tions and their dangerous potentialities are discussed in Schnader, Looking Ahead at
the Uniform Coinnmercial Code, 19 Bus. LAW 771 (1964).
Like problems exist in other uniform-legislation areas. The difficulties which the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has experienced in
devising a method for coping with divergence in the construction of uniform legislation
are indicated in the REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE ON UNIFORMITY OF JUDICIAL




This Appendix includes only the statutory sections which the authors
deem necessary for an understanding of the text. For further ref-
erences see the English translation of Japanese statutes in 2 EIBUN
HSREIsHA LAW BULLETIN SERIEs, JAPAN.
The translation of the material which appears in this Appendix
was done by Professor Sono.
CIVIL CODE
Things. Art. 85. A thing within the meaning of this Code is a corporeal
thing.
Art. 86. 1. Land and things firmly affixed thereto are immovables.
2. All other things are movables.
3. Obligations performable to a bearer shall be deemed to be movables.
Art. 88. 1. Products obtained in the ordinary use of a thing are natural
fruits.
2. Money and other things received as consideration for the use of a
thing are legal fruits.
Art. 89. 1. Natural fruits belong to the person who has the right to
take them at the time of their severance from the principal thing.
2. Legal fruits shall accrue in proportion to the number of days during
which the right to acquire them continues to exist.
Juristic Act. Art. 90. A juristic act which has for its object such matters
as are contrary to public policy or good morals is null and void.
Art. 99. 1. An expression of intention made by a representative within
the scope of his authority and disclosing the fact that he is acting for a
principal shall be effective directly against his principal.
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply mutatis
mutandis to an expression of intention made by a third person to a repre-
sentative.
Art. 100. An expression of intention made by a representative without
disclosing that he is acting for a principal is deemed to have been made
on his own behalf, but the provisions of para. 1 of the preceding article
shall apply with necessary modifications if the other party was aware, or
should have been aware, that it was made on behalf of the principal.
(Cf. COMMERCIAL CoDE art. 504.)
General Provisions of Real Rights. Art. 175. No real rights can be
created other than those provided for in this Code or in other laws.
Art. 176. The creation and transfer of real rights takes effect by a
mere expression of intention by the parties concerned. (Cf. art. 344.)
Art. 177. The acquisition or loss of, or any alteration in a real right
over, an immovable cannot be set up against a third person until it has
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been registered in accordance with the provisions of law concerning regis-
tration of property.
Art. 178. The transfer of a real right over a movable cannot be set up
against a third person until the movable has been delivered.
Possessory Right. Art. 181. A possessory right may be acquired by
proxy.
Art. 182. 1. The transfer of a possessory right is effected by delivery
of the thing in possession.
2. Where the transferee or his representative actually holds a thing,
the transfer of the possessory right may be effected by a mere expression
of intention by the parties.
Art. 184. If, where a thing is possessed through a representative, the
principal directs him to hold the thing thereafter on behalf of a third
person and the third person gives his consent thereto, such third person
shall acquire the possessory right.
Art. 186. 1. A possessor is presumed to be in possession with the
intention of holding as owner, in good faith, peacefully and publicly.
Art. 188. A possessor shall be presumed to hold lawfully the right
which he exercises over the thing in possession.
Art. 192. If a person has peacefully and publicly commenced to possess
a movable, acting in good faith and without negligence, he shall immediately
acquire the right which he purports to exercise over such movable. (Ref.
art. 186(1), 188; Cf. Law on Bills art. 16(2), 77(1); Law on Checks
art. 21; COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 229, 519.)
Art. 200. 1. If a possessor has been deprived of his possession, he may
by an action for recovery of possession demand the return of the thing as
well as reparation in damages.
Art. 202. 1. Possessory actions and actions on title shall not exclude
each other.
2. Possessory actions may not be decided upon grounds relating to the
original title.
Ownership. Art. 243. If two or more movables belonging to different
owners are so united together that they can no longer be separated without
damage, the ownership of the composite thing vests in the owner of the
principal movables. The same shall apply if their severance would entail
excessive expense.
Art. 244. If in regard to movables united together no distinction of
principal and accessory can be made, the owners of such movables shall
own the composite thing jointly in proportion to the value of the movables
at the time they were united together.
Art. 245. The provisions of the preceding two articles shall apply
mutatis mutandis, if things belonging to different owners are mixed to-
gether so as to be no longer distinguishable from each other.
Art. 246. 1. When a person has applied work to a movable belonging
to another person, the ownership of the thing created by the work shall
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belong to the owner of the material; but if the value arising out of such
workmanship considerably exceeds that of the material, the person who
has applied the work shall acquire the ownership of the thing.
2. If a person who has applied work has furnished a part of the material,
he shall acquire the ownership of the thing only if the value of the material
so furnished together with the value arising out of his workmanship
exceeds the value of the material furnished by the other person.
Art. 248. A person who has suffered a loss by the application of the
provisions of any of the preceding six articles may claim compensation in
accordance with the provisions of arts. 703 and 704 (unjust enrichment
provisions).
Possessory Lien. Art. 296. A person having a possessory lien may
exercise his right over the whole of the thing retained until his claim has
been fully satisfied.
Art. 297. 1. A person having a possessory lien may collect the fruits
proceeding from the thing retained and may appropriate them to the satis-
faction of his claim in preference to other creditors.
2. The fruit mentioned in the preceding paragraph must first be
appropriated to the payment of the interest and the surplus, if any, to the
principal. (Ref. arts. 88, 89.)
Art. 298. 1. A person having a possessory lien must keep the thing
retained with the care of a good, prudent manager.
2. A person having a possessory lien may not without the consent of the
debtor use or let the thing retained or give it as security; but this shall not
apply to such use of the thing as is necessary for its preservation.
3. If a person having a possessory lien contravenes the provisions of
the preceding two paragraphs, the debtor may demand the extinction of
the right of possessory lien.
Art. 299. 1. If a person having a possessory lien has defrayed necessary
expenses for the thing retained, he may require the owner to reimburse him.
2. If a person having a possessory lien has defrayed useful expenses for
the thing retained, he may, so long as an increase in value remains sub-
sisting, require that reimbursement be made of either the amount defrayed
or the amount by which its value has increased at the option of the owner;
but the court may upon the application of the owner allow him a reasonable
time for reimbursement.
Art. 300. The existence of a possessory lien shall not prevent the
Statute of Limitations from running against the claim.
Preferential Right. Art. 303. A person having a preferential right in
accordance with the provisions of this Code or other laws has a right to
obtain satisfaction of his claim out of the property of the debtor in
preference to other creditors.
Art. 304. 1. A preferential right may also be exercised against money
or other things which the debtor is entitled to receive by reason of the sale,
letting, or loss of the object of such right, or of damage sustained by it;
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but the person having such preferential right must levy an attachment
thereon prior to their payment or delivery.
2. The same shall apply to the consideration for a real right created by
the debtor on the object of the preferential right.
Art. 311. A person who has a claim which has arisen from any of the
causes mentioned below has a preferential right over the specific movable
of the debtor:
1. - 4. (omitted)
5. Preservation of movables;
6. Sale of movables;
7, 8. (omitted)
Art. 322. The preferential right given a seller of a movable covers the
price and interest thereon.
Art. 330. 1. Where several specific preferential rights co-exist in one
and the same movable, their priority shall be in the following order:
A. Preferential rights for the lease of an immovable, for lodging at an
inn, and for carriage;
B. Preferential right for the preservation of the movable; but if there
are two or more preservers, the later preserved shall take precedence
over the earlier one;
c. Preferential rights for the sale of the movable; for the supply of
seeds, seedlings, or fertilizers; and for agricultural and industrial labor.
2. If a person having a preferential right of the first rank was aware, at
the time he acquired it, of the existence of a person having a preferential
right of the second or third rank, he may not exercise his right of priority
as against such person; the same shall apply as against a person who has
preserved a thing for the benefit of the person having a preferential right
of the first rank.
Art. 333. After the debtor has delivered the movable to a transferee,
the preferential right cannot be exercised over it.
Art. 334. Where a preferential right and a pledge co-exist over a
movable, the pledgee shall have the same right as the person having a
preferential right of the first rank mentioned in art. 330.
General Provision of Pledge. Art. 342. A pledgee is entitled to hold
possession of the thing which he has received from the debtor or a third
person as security for his obligation, and to obtain satisfaction of his claim
out of the thing in preference to other creditors.
Art. 343. A thing which is not assignable cannot be made the subject
of a pledge.
Art. 344. A pledge shall become effective upon the delivery to the
creditor of the thing pledged. (Ref. arts. 181, 182, 184.)
Art. 345. A pledgee cannot let the pledgor hold possession of the thing
pledged on his behalf. (Ref. arts. 181, 182, 184.)
Art. 346. Unless otherwise provided in the act of creation, a pledge
shall secure the principal, interest, penalty, expense for enforcement of the
pledge, expense for preservation of the thing pledged, and the damages
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arising from the non-performance of the obligation or from latent defects
in the thing pledged.
Art. 347. A pledgee may retain the thing pledged until he obtains
satisfaction of his claim mentioned in the preceding article; but this right
cannot be set up against any creditor who has priority over him. (Ref.
arts. 334, 330, 355; National Tax Collection Law arts. 15, 17, 18.)
Art. 348. The pledgee may on his own responsibility repledge the
thing pledged for a period of time not exceeding the duration of his own
right; in such case he shall be responsible for damage due to vis major
which would not have occurred, if the thing had not been repledged.
Art. 349. A pledgor may not, either by the act of creation or by a
contract made before the time the obligation becomes due, agree that the
pledgee shall by way of satisfaction of his claim acquire the ownership
of the thing pledged or dispose of it otherwise than in the manner provided
for by law. (Cf. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 515.)
Art. 350. The provisions of arts. 296 to 300 (provisions on possessory
liens) and art. 304 shall apply mutatis mutandis to pledges.
Art. 351. If a person who has pledged his own property to secure a
debt of another discharges the debt or loses the ownership of the thing
pledged in consequence of the enforcement of the pledge, he is entitled to be
indemnified by the debtor in accordance with the provisions relating to
suretyship.
Pledge of Movables. Art. 352. The pledgee of a movable cannot set up
his pledge against a third person unless he continuously holds possession
of the thing pledged.
Art. 353. If the pledgee of a movable is deprived of his possession of
the thing pledged, he can recover it only by an action for recovery of
possession. (Ref. arts. 200, 202.)
Art. 354. If the pledgee of a movable does not obtain performance of
his obligation, he may apply to the court to have the thing pledged appro-
priated to himself in satisfaction of the obligation to the extent of its
value appraised by an expert, provided there is just reason for doing so.
In such case the pledgee must give the debtor notice of the application
in advance.
Art. 355. If several pledges have been created on a movable to secure
several obligations, the order of their priority shall be according to the
date of their creation.
Pledge of Intangibles. Art. 362. 1. Intangibles may be the object of
pledge.
2. The provisions of the last three Sections (arts. 342-361) shall apply
mnutatis mutandis to the pledges mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in
addition to the provisions of this Section (arts. 362-368).
Art. 363. When an obligation evidenced by a writing is pledged, the
pledge is effected by the delivery of the writing. (See also art. 366.)
Art. 364. 1. Where a nominative debt has been made the object of a
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pledge, the pledge cannot be set up against the original debtor or other
third person unless the debtor has been notified of the creation of the
pledge in accordance with the provisions of art. 467 or unless he has given
his consent thereto.
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to non-
bearer shares. (Ref. art. 363; COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 207, 209.)
Art. 365. Where a non-bearer debenture has been made the object of
a pledge, the pledge cannot be set up against the company or other third
person unless the creation of the pledge has been entered in the books of
the company in accordance with the provisions relating to the transfer of
debentures.
Art. 366. Where a debt payable to order has been made the object of
a pledge, the pledge cannot be set up against a third person unless its
creation is indorsed on the instrument. (n.b., It is the opinion of scholars
that this article should be read as stating a requirement for the creation
of a pledge even as between the immediate parties. That delivery and
indorsement will create a pledge seems clear. If the instrument is a
negotiable one and the indorsement is "regular," the indorsee is prima
facie the owner and the indorser may be unable to rebut the presumption
and so will never reach the pledge issue. Theoretically a regular indorse-
ment will satisfy the article and such indorsements are used. Indorsements
"for security" or "in pledge" readily satisfy the articles but are restrictive
and are for that reason not widely used.)
Art. 367. 1. A pledgee may directly collect the obligation which is the
subject of the pledge.
2. If the subject-matter of the obligation is money, the pledgee may
collect only such portion thereof as corresponds to the amount of his own
claim.
3. If the obligation mentioned above has fallen due earlier than the
pledgee's claim, the pledgee may require the original obligor to deposit
the amount payable with the Court Depository. In such case the pledge
shall exist over the money so deposited.
4. If the subject-matter of the obligation is not money, the pledgee has
a right of pledge in the thing received in performance thereof.
Art. 368. In addition to the interests and remedies provided for in the
preceding article, a pledgee may enforce his pledge by compulsory process
as provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Obligations. Art. 415. If an obligor fails to effect performance in
accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may
claim damages; the same shall apply to cases where performance becomes
impossible for any cause for which the obligor is responsible.
Art. 416. 1. A demand of compensation for damages shall be for the
amount of such damages as would ordinarily arise from the non-perform-
ance of an obligation.
2. The obligee may also recover the damages which have arisen through
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special circumstances if the parties had foreseen or could have foreseen
such circumstances.
Art. 417. Unless a different intention has been expressed, the amount
of damages shall be assessed in money.
Art. 418. If there has been any fault on the part of the obligee in regard
to the non-performance of the obligation, the court shall take it into account
in determining the responsibility for, and assessing the amount of the
damages.
Art. 467. 1. The assignment of a nominative debt cannot be set up
against the debtor or any other third person unless the assignor has given
notice thereof to the debtor or the debtor has consented thereto.
2. The notice or consent mentioned in the preceding paragraph cannot
be set up against a third person other than the debtor unless it is made
by a document having an authenticated date.
Bailment. Art. 662. Even where a time has been fixed by the parties
for the return of the thing bailed, the bailor may at any time demand its
return.
Art. 665. The provisions of arts. 646 to 649 inclusive and art. 650(1)
tnd (2) (Mandate provisions) shall apply mutatis mutandis to bailments.
(Art. 650(1) reads: "If a mandatory has defrayed any expenses which
can be recognized as necessary for the management of the business en-
trusted to him, he may demand from the mandator the reimbursement of
such expenses with interest thereon from the day on which they were
defrayed.")
Unjust Enrichment. Art. 703. A person who without any legal ground
acquires benefit from the property or services of another and thereby
causes loss to the latter is bound to return such benefit to the extent that
it still exists.
Art. 704. A person who is enriched in bad faith must return the benefit
received by him together with interest thereon, and if there has been any
damage, he is bound also to make compensation for it.
COMMncL CODE:
Art. 4. 1. A merchant within the meaning of this Code is a person
who, on his own behalf, engages in commercial transactions as a business.
(Ref. arts. 501-503)
2. A person who engages in the sale of goods as a business with a shop
or similar equipment or a person who carries on mining business shall be
deemed to be a merchant even if he does not engage in commercial trans-
actions as a business. The same shall apply to a company of the nature
mentioned in art. 52(2).
Art. 52. 1. The term "company" as used in this Code shall mean an
association incorporated for the purpose of engaging in commercial trans-
actions as a business.
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2. An association which has for its object the acquisition of gain and is
incorporated in accordance with the provisions of this Book [Book II-
Companies] shall be deemed to be a company even if it does not engage
in commercial transactions as a business.
Art. 205. 1. A non-bearer share shall be transferred by an indorsement
on the share certificate or by the delivery of the certificate with a separate
instrument of assignment signed by the person whose name appears on
the certificate as the owner.
2. The provisions of arts. 12 (Requisites of indorsement) and 13 (Form
of indorsement), art. 14(2) (Effect of indorsement), and art. 16(1) of
the Law on Bills shall apply mutatis mutandis to indorsements on a share
certificate.
3. The possessor of a non-bearer share certificate shall be deemed to be
the lawful holder if he establishes his title to the share by means of the
instrument of assignment mentioned in para. 1. The same shall also apply
in cases where the full name of an assignee is not mentioned in such
instrument.
Art. 206. 1. The transfer of a non-bearer share cannot be set up against
the company until the full name and permanent residence of the transferee
have been entered in the register of shareholders.
Art. 207. 1. In order to effect a pledge of a non-bearer share, the share
certificate shall be delivered to the pledgee.
2. Unless a pledgee continues to be in possession of the share certificate,
he cannot set up his pledge against third persons.
Art. 208. When there has been retirement, consolidation, splitting up,
conversion, purchase, or the issuance of shares made in accordance with
the provisions of art. 293-3(2) (Crediting the reserve fund to the stated
capital), a pledge over the former shares shall extend to the money or
shares which the shareholder is to receive in consequence of the retire-
ment, consolidation, splitting up, conversion, purchase, or the issuance of
shares made in accordance with the provisions of art. 293-3(2).
Art. 209. 1. If, in cases where a pledge has been created over a non-
bearer share, the company has entered upon application by the pledgor the
full name and permanent residence of the pledgee in the register of share-
holders and his full name in the share certificate, the pledgee may receive
from the company the distribution of profits and interest or the distribution
of the surplus assets or money mentioned in the preceding article and may
appropriate them to the discharge of obligations due to him in preference
to other creditors.
2. The provisions of art 367(3) of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
3. The right of the pledgee mentioned in paragraph 1 shall extend to
shares to be received by the shareholder in accordance with the provisions
of art. 293-2(1) (Dividend in the shape of shares).
4. The pledgee mentioned in para. 1 may demand of the company delivery
of the share certificate which is to be received by the shareholder mentioned
in the preceding paragraph or the preceding article.
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Art. 229. The provisions of art. 21 of the Law on Checks shall apply
mutatis mutandis in cases where a share certificate is a share certificate to
bearer or where a share certificate is a non-bearer share certificate and the
holder thereof established his right in accordance with the provisions of art.
205(2) or (3).
Art. 501. The transactions mentioned below are commercial transac-
tions:
1. Transactions the object of which is either the acquisition for value of
movables, immovables, or valuable instruments with the intention of dispos-
ing of them at a profit, or the disposal of objects so acquired;
2. Contracts for the supply of movables or valuable instruments which
are to be acquired from others, and transactions the object of which is to
acquire them for value in order to carry out such contracts;
3. Transactions on exchange;
4. Transactions relating to bills and other commercial papers.
Art. 502. The transactions mentioned below, if effected as a business,
are commercial transactions, except such transactions as are effected by
persons who manufacture articles or render services solely for the purpose
of earning wages:
1. Transactions the object of which is the acquisition for value or the
hire of movables or immovables with the intention of letting them, or the
letting of objects so acquired or hired;
2. Transactions relating to the manufacture or working up of things for
other persons;
3. Transactions relating to the supply of electricity or gas;
4. Transactions relating to carriage;
5. Contracts for the execution of works or for the supply of labor;
6. Transactions relating to publishing, printing, or photographing;
7. Transactions relating to the operation of establishments the object of
which is to receive visitors;
8. Money changing and other banking transactions;
9. Insurance;
10. Acceptance of deposits;
11. Transactions relating to brokerage or commission agencies;
12. Acceptance of agency for commercial transactions.
Art. 503. 1. Transactions effected by a merchant for the purpose of his
business are commercial transactions. (Ref. art. 4.)
2. The transactions of a merchant shall be presumed to be effected for the
purpose of his business.
Art. 504. A commercial transaction by a representative shall be effective
as against his principal even though the representative has not disclosed the
fact that he is acting for the principal. However, this shall not prevent the
other party from demanding performance from the representative if he did
not know that the transaction was effected on behalf of the principal. (Cf.
CIVIL CODE arts. 99, 100.)
Art. 515 The provisions of art. 349 of the Civil Code shall not apply to
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a pledge created to secure an obligation which has arisen out of a commer-
cial transaction.
Art. 519. The provisions of arts. 12 to 14(2) inclusive (Requisites of
indorsement, form of indorsement, effect of indorsement) of the Law of
Bills and of art. 5 (2) (Indication of payee) and arts. 19 and 21 of the Law
on Checks shall apply mutatis mutandis to valuable instruments which have
for their object the payment or delivery of money or other things or of
valuable instruments.
Art. 573. Where a bill of lading has been made, no disposition of the
goods shall be effected except by means of the bill of lading. (Arts. 573-
575 are applied mutatis mutandis to a warehouse receipt at art. 604 and to
an ocean bill of lading at art. 776.)
Art. 574. Even where a bill of lading has been issued in favor of a
specified person, it may be transferred by indorsement unless the bill itself
contains provisions forbidding indorsement.
Art. 575. If a bill of lading has been delivered to a person who is
entitled thereby to receive the goods, such delivery shall have the same effect
in respect to the acquisition of rights exercisable over the goods as the
delivery of the goods themselves.
Art. 584. In cases where a bill of lading has been issued, no delivery of
the goods can be demanded except upon surrender of such bill of lading.
Art. 593. Where a merchant has accepted a deposit (bailment) within
the scope of his business, he shall exercise the care of a good, prudent man-
ager even though he has received no remuneration.
Art. 848. 1. A registered ship may form the subject-matter of a hy-
pothec.
2. A hypothec on a ship shall extend to its appurtenances.
3. The provisions relating to hypothec on immovables shall apply mutatis
mutandis to hypothec on ships.
LAw ON BILLS (Tegatah6) (Law No. 20, 1932)
Art. 16. 1. The possessor of a bill of exchange is presumed to be the
lawful holder if he establishes his title to the bill through an uninterrupted
series of indorsements, even if the last indorsement is in blank. In this
connection, cancelled indorsements shall be disregarded. When an indorse-
ment in blank is followed by another indorsement, the person who signed
this last indorsement is presumed to have acquired the bill by the indorse-
ment in blank.
2. Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of exchange, in any
manner whatsoever, the holder who establishes his right thereto in the
manner mentioned in the preceding paragraph is not bound to give up the
bill unless he has acquired it in bad faith, or unless in acquiring it he has
been guilty of gross negligence.
Art. 19. 1. When an indorsement contains the statements "value in
security," "value in pledge," or any other statement implying a pledge, the
holder may exercise all the rights arising out of the bill of exchange, but an
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indorsement by him has the effects only of an indorsement by a represent-
ative.
Art. 77. 1. The following provisions relating to bills of axchange apply
mutatis mutandis to promissory notes so far as they are not inconsistent
with the nature of these instruments, viz.:
1. Indorsement (arts. 11 to 20);
2. -(9) (omitted).
LAw ON CHEcKS (Kogittehd) (Law No. 57, 1933)
Art. 19. The possessor of an indorsable check is presumed to be the
lawful holder if he establishes his title to the check through an uninterrupted
series of indorsements, even if the last indorsement is in blank. In this
connection cancelled indorsements shall be disregarded. When an indorse-
ment in blank is followed by another indorsement, the person who signed
this last indorsement is presumed to have acquired the check by the indorse-
ment in blank.
Art. 21. Where a person has, in any manner whatsoever, been dis-
possessed of a check (whether it is a check to bearer or an indorsable check
to which the holder establishes his right in the manner mentioned in art.
19), the holder into whose possession the check has come is not bound to
give up the check unless he has acquired it in bad faith, or unless in acquir-
ing it he has been guilty of gross negligence.
CODE OF CML PROCEDURE
Art. 394. The second appeal may be made only on the ground that there
is an error in construction of the Constitution or other violation of the
Constitution in a judgment, or that there exists a violation of law or
ordinance material to a judgment.
Art. 549. 1. Where a third person claims ownership in the objects of
execution, or where he asserts that he has such a right as may prevent the
transfer or the delivery of the same, he is to assert his objection against
the execution by way of an action against the creditor or, where the debtor
does not consider the objection to be well founded, against both the creditor
and the debtor.
CIVIL PROCEDURm REGULATIONS (Minji sosh6 kisoku)
(Enacted on Mar. 1, 1956, by Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 1956;
enforced from June 1, 1956.)
Art. 48. In case the second appeal is lodged on the ground that there is
a contravention of laws or ordinances in the judgment, if it is alleged that
the judgment contravenes judicial precedents established by the Supreme
Court, the former Supreme Court (Daishin-in), or High Courts as the




BANKRUPTCY ACT (Hasanhd) (Law No. 71, 1922)
Art. 87. An adjudication of bankruptcy shall not affect the right to re-
cover properties not belonging to the bankrupt from the bankrupt estate.
Art. 88. Any person who transferred property to a bankrupt prior to the
adjudication of bankruptcy may not recover the property on the ground
that the transfer has been made for the purpose of security.
Art. 92. A person who has a specific preferential right, right of pledge,
or right of hypothec over property belonging to the bankrupt estate shall
have the right of exclusion on property forming the subject-matter of these
rights.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAW (Kaisha k6seihd)
Law No. 172, 1952)
Art. 123. 1. Reorganization claims, or claims against persons other
than the company arising out of causes existent prior to the commence-
ment of reorganization procedure, which are secured by the assets of the
company at the time of commencement or reorganization procedure such
as a specific preferential right, pledge, hypothec, or the right of possessory
lien under the Commercial Code, shall be reorganization security rights.
PUBLIC SATEs LAW (Keibaihd) (Law No. 15, 1898)
Art. 2. 3. The purchaser may not receive the delivery of the subject
matter of the public sale unless he performs the obligation to holders of the
possessory lien, pledgees holding rights of priority against the seller, as well
as to creditors who possess rights of priority against such pledgees.
Art. 3. 1. The public sale of movables shall be conducted by a bailiff of
the summary court wherein the sale is to be carried out, upon mandate by a
person holding the possessory lien or the preferential right, or a pledgee,
as well as by other persons who intend to carry out the sale by virtue of the
provisions of the Civil Code or of the Commercial Code.
Art. 7. 1. Notice of the place and time of the sale must be given to the
public in advance.
Art. 8. Notice of the place and time of the sale must be sent to interested
parties; this shall not apply, however, where the address and the residence
of such parties are unknown.
Art. 9. There must be a period of not less than five days between the
public notice and the public sale, unless there exist circumstances which
require earlier conduct of the sale.
NATIONAL TAX COLLECTON LAW (Kokuzei ch6shfzhd
(Law No. 147, 1959)
Art. 15. 1. Where a taxpayer has created a pledge on his property prior
to the statutory due date of payment, the national tax shall be collected from
the conversion proceeds after the obligation secured by such pledge has
been collected: (omitted)
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Art. 17. 1. Where a taxpayer has been transferred property on which
a pledge or hypothec is created, the national tax shall be collected from the
conversion proceeds of the property after the obligation secured by the
pledge or hypothec has been collected.
Art. 18. 1. The amount of principal of the obligations secured by a
pledge or hypothec which precedes a national tax by virtue of the provisions
of the preceding three articles shall be limited to the amount of obligation
at the time the pledges or hypothecary obligee has received the notice of
attachment or demand for delivery relative to the national tax; provided,
however, that this shall not apply in cases where the right of a person
possessing another obligation which precedes the national tax concerned is
likely to be affected.
Art. 24. 1. Where a taxpayer has failed to pay a national tax, if there
exists property which he transferred and which constitutes because of such
transfer the subject matter of security (hereinafter referred to as "property
subject to jfto tampo"), the taxpayer's national tax may be collected from
the property subject to joto tampo only where it is considered that the tax
delinquency measures taken against the other assets of the taxpayer would
be insufficient for the payment of the national tax to be collected.
Exhibits*
No. 1
PLEDGE AGREEMENT ON TANGIBLES
Name and Address of
Revenue the Pledgee-Creditor:
Stamp
Name and Address of
the Pledgor-Debtor:
We, the above-mentioned parties, hereby enter into the following agreement for
loans and creation of pledges.
1. The debtor has received from the creditor the sum of .........................
Y en (Y ................................ ) as a loan.
2. The parties agree that the debt shall be due on ........................................... 19 ......
3. The parties agree that the interest for the loan shall be ............................................ Yen
(Y ................................ ) a month and the debtor agrees to pay the said amount by the
last day of each month.
4. The parties agree that the debt shall be paid at the creditor's address at the time
of performance.
5. Upon the occurrence of default in the payment of interest for any two months, all
the indebtedness shall immediately become due, with benefit of maturity waived.
6. The debtor has created pledge-rights on the following tangibles for the creditor
as collateral security for due payment of his debt and the creditor has received the




7. The pledgee-creditor shall be secured by this pledge to any and all his claims
against the debtor including charges incurred in connection with preservation of the
pledged tangibles, expenses for the realization on the pledge-right as well as the prin-
cipal sum of the debt and its interest.
8. The parties agree that the place for returning the pledged things to the debtor
shall be the place of their actual location.
Date
Signature of
P ledgee-Creditor: .................................................... (Seal)
Signature of
Pledgor-Debtor: ....................... (Seal)
*These exhibits only illustrate the basic types of forms used. The forms may be
modified to meet different situations, and examples of modified versions can be found
in ONO & IMANSHI, KEIYAKU ZENSHO (Complete collection of contracts) (1962)
and BRAUCHER & MICHIDA, 2 AMERIKA SHOTORIHIKIHO TO NIHON MINSHOHO
("American Law on Commercial Transactions and the Japanese Civil and Commercial
Codes") 460-483 (1961).
PERSONAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL
No. 2
Revet JOTO TAMPO AGREEMENTStamp
1. The debtor has received from the creditor the sum of ............................................ Yen
(T ............................... ) as a loan.
2. The parties agree that the debt shall be due on ........................................... 19 ............
payable at the creditor's address at the time of performance.
3. The parties agree the interest rate for this loan shall be ............................................ 0
a year and the debtor agrees to pay the interest monthly by the last day of each month.
4. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, the debt shall immediately
become due, with benefit of maturity waived, without any notice from the creditor.
a. Default in the payment of interest for any month.
b. Default in reporting any change in the debtor's address or residence.
c. In the event of an application being made by a third party for attachment,
provisional attachment, provisional disposition, bankruptcy, or official auction
of property against the debtor.
d. And further, any breach of this agreement.
5. In order to secure the debt, the debtor has transferred his ownership to the goods
described in paragraph 7 to the creditor and delivered the same to the creditor as
collateral security under the following conditions.
a. The ownership to the goods shall be transferred to the debtor upon the full
payment of his debt.
b. If the debtor fails to perform any duty or obligation stipulated in this agree-
ment, the creditor may dispose of the collateral furnished by the debtor and
may appropriate the proceeds to the debtor's obligations. Also, we agree that
the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
6. The parties agree that the creditor lent and delivered the said goods to the debtor
enabling him to use them free of charge until the due date of the debt indicated in
paragraph 2 and that the debtor received the delivery of the said goods under the
following conditions.
a. On debtor's default in observing any of the conditions prescribed in this agree-
ment, the lease shall be rescinded and the debtor shall return and deliver
immediately all the borrowed goods to the creditor.
b. Upon the full performance by the debtor of all his obligations, the relation of
the parties to the goods as prescribed in this paragraph shall terminate without
any action.
7. Description of the goods for collateral security (jtto tampo):
8. The debtor warrants that there are no conflicting interests held by others in the
goods and shall be responsible for this warranty.
9. In case the goods decrease in their value excessively due to any reason, thus becom-
ing insufficient as the collateral security, the debtor agrees to provide the creditor with
such additional collateral as may be required by the creditor or to make immediate
partial payment of the debt as may be required by the creditor.
Date
Name and Address of
the Creditor: ..........................................................................
Signature: ..............................................................................
Name and Address of








THE BANK OF TOKYO, LTD.**
Manager Chief Clerk
D A T E : ............................. .......










Date of Cargo Arrival
Your L/C No ............................................ Remarks
L/C Foreign Bank's L/C No ..........................
L/C A m ount .............................................
In consideration of your granting at my/our request the delivery to me/us of the
following shipping documents for the purpose of my/our taking custody of or disposing
of the goods covered thereby for and on behalf of your Bank, viz:
1. Bill of Lading in ..................... copies 2. Invoice in ........................ copies
3. Certificate of Origin 4. Marine Insurance Policy
in .......... copies in ....................... copies
5.
which your Bank holds as collateral security for due payment of the Bill of Exchange
draw n upon .. ... ............... ................... by M essrs....................... of
.... . .................. under the above-mentioned Letter of Credit or
.. ................. I and accepted by me/us, or for due payment
of the Promissory Note issued by me/us No .................................... .Bank Reference
No . .. .for the amount of .......... -- .......... ...... payable on date of
I/we hereby agree to perform all of the following terms.
1. I/We acknowledge that unless and until the said Bill of Exchange accepted by
me/us or Promissory Note issued by me/us is duly paid by me/us, your Bank shall
remain owner of the said Bill(s) of Lading or the relative goods as long as they are
held in my/our custody.
2. I/We undertake to act as agent for and on behalf of your Bank for the purpose
of effecting discharge, clearance, storage, insurance, and/or sale of the said goods and
to immediately pay to your Bank the proceeds of any or all sales thereof when received
by me/us.
* It is customary, where trust financing is contemplated, for a Japanese hank to take from its
customer an "agreement" which sets out many of the details of the proposed transactions. Some of
these details are reiterated in the actual trust receipts later executed and some are not. The prac-
tice varies and a particular provision, such as an insurance clause, which is typically in the
underlying agreement, may or may not recur in the trust receipts.
** Forms 3 and 4 are reproduced here with the consent of the Bank of Tokyo.
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3. I/We undertake to bear any and all charges incurred in connection with the dis-
charge, clearance, carriage, storage, insurance, and/or sale of the said goods, as well as
import duty and other taxes thereof, if any.
4. In case I/we sell the said goods for and on behalf of your Bank I/we undertake
that I/we shall not sell them on credit to the buyer(s) thereof without the written
consent of your Bank, and further undertake to inform your Bank promptly of the
means of payment thereof and other terms relating to the said sale(s).
5. I/We undertake to make it a general principle to deliver the said goods only
against cash payment, but in the event that delivery of the said goods shall be made
against other means of payment such as aBil of Exchange or a Promissory Note,
I/we further undertake to notify your Bank beforehand of the name(s) of the
party(ies) thereof and to obtain the approval of your Bank before any such deliv-
ery(ies) of the goods are effected, and to lodge the Bill of Exchange or the
Promissory Note, etc., with your Bank without delay when it is received by me/us.
I/We acknowledge that your Bank is entirely at liberty whether to collect at
maturity or to discount before maturity the said Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note
etc. or to return the same entrusting me/us with the disposal thereof.
6. In case the said goods shall be stored in the warehouse owned by me/us with
the consent of your Bank I/we undertake to keep the said goods separately from other
goods, and to place them in the particular space allotted to your Bank and I/we shall
make no objection to your Bank against your inspecting the said goods at any time or
times, either alone or conjointly with other interested parties. I/We further agree
to return the said goods to your Bank at any time or times forthwith upon request of
your Bank.
If the said goods are to be stored in a warehouse other than mine/ours, I/we
engage to comply with any instructions of your Bank issued in connection therewith.
7. I/We hold myself/ourselves wholly responsible for any and all losses and/or
damages which may occur to the said goods, and, moreover, in case your Bank may
judge the goods to be decreasing in their value due to the above or any other reasons,
thus becoming insufficient as the collateral security, I/we agree to provide you with
such collateral money, equivalent collateral, or additional collateral as may be required
by your Bank.
8. I/We further agree to keep the said goods insured up to the maximum insurable
value thereof against fire and/or damages of any other nature, and I/we undertake to
contract with the insurance company for providing insurance claims to be made payable
by the said insurance company direct to our Bank.
9. As to any matters not stipulated in this Agreement, I/we undertake to observe
any and all of the terms of the Commercial Letter of Credit Agreement which I/we
have signed and presented to your Bank.
Revenue Signature ..................................................................................
Stam p Full N am e ................................................................................
A ddress ....................................................................................
I/We hold myself/ourselves responsible jointly and severally with the above
principal party, for the due fulfilment of the obligations enumerated in this Trust
Receipt, and keep your Bank perfectly free from any and all losses and/or damages
in connection therewith.
Signature ..................................................................................
FoR GuARANTOR Full Name ................................................................................
Address






THE BANK OF TOKYO, LTD.
M2 fanager Chief Clerk
DATE : ........................................






Date of Cargo Arrival
Your L/C No ........................................... Remarks
L/C Foreign Bank's L/C No ..........................
L/C Amount .........................................
In consideration of your granting at my/our request the delivery to me/us of the
following shipping documents for the purpose of my/our effecting discharge, clearance,
and storage of the goods covered thereby for and on behalf of your Bank, viz:
1. Bill of Lading in ........................ copies 2. Invoice in .............. copies
3. Certificate of Origin 4. Marine Insurance Policy
in ....................... copies in ....................... copies
5 ............................................ M . .... ...................................... .......... ....
which your Bank holds as collateral security for the due payment of the Bills of
Exchange drawn upon ....................... by Messrs................
of . ..... ......... .............................. .......... under the above-mentioned Letter of
Credit or ........... ........... , and accepted by me/us, or for the due payment
of the Promissory Note issued by me/us No ............. ........ Bank Reference
No ........ ........ for the amount of ....... . ....... ............. payable on the
date of ......... . . .............................. I/we hereby agree to perform all of the
following terms.
1. I/We acknowledge that your Bank shall remain owner of the said Bill(s) of
Lading or the relative goods.
2. I/We undertake to act as agent for and on behalf of your Bank for the purpose
of effecting discharge, clearance, and/or storage of the goods covered by the said
Bill (s) of Lading.
3. I/We undertake to store the said goods in a warehouse designated by your
Bank at ...................... ............ .. after discharging and clearing
the said goods, and agree to submit to you immediately the relative warehouse
warrant issued in the name of your Bank.
No. 4
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4. I/We agree to indemnify you against any and all losses or damages which may
occur to the said goods during voyage and/or discharge, and to sue on your
behalf for compensation thereof from the Shipping Company and/or Insurance
Agent.
S. I/We undertake to pay any and all charges and expenses necessary for dis-
charge, clearance, carriage or storage of the said goods as well as import
duties and other taxes thereof.
6. As to any matters not stipulated in this Agreement, I/we undertake to observe
any and all of the terms of the Commercial Letter of Credit Agreement which
I/we have signed and presented to your Bank.
Signature ..................................................................................
Full N am e ..............................................................................
A ddress ....................................................................................
In consideration of my/our undertaking upon request of the above principal party
the discharge and storage of the said goods on your behalf, I/we hold myself/ourselves
responsible jointly and severally with the above principal party for the due fulfilment
of the obligations enumerated in this Trust Receipt, and keep your Bank perfectly free
from any and all loss and/or damage in connection therewith.
Signature ..................................................................................











To THE ------------------------------------------------- COMPANY, LTD.
Description of Merchandise
Type: ............. Set No.: ............... Quantity: .........................
Sale Price: ......... Yen (y .......... )
This is to certify that I have purchased from you the merchandise above mentioned
under the following agreements.
1. In consideration of receiving the above merchandise from the Company I have paid
-.................. Yen (Y ................ ), the first payment on delivery of the
merchandise to me, and I agree to pay on .................................... day of each month to the
Company or to the collector of the Company without notice or demand the sum of
.................................................. Y en (Y ............................ ) in m onthly paym ents until the full
price of the merchandise has been paid by me.
2. It is expressly understood and agreed to by me that the ownership of the said mer-
chandise will remain in the Company until I have paid the full price of the merchandise
as above mentioned and I agree to hold the said merchandise with the care of a good
manager.
3. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, the Company may at its pleasure
claim the immediate payment of the full value of the merchandise or rescind the con-
tract and repossess the merchandise.
A. Default in the payment of any single installment when due.
B. Default in my observing any of the conditions prescribed in paragraphs 5, 6,
or 8.
C. And further, any default in my performance of the duties for the custody of
the merchandise.
4. Should the Company decide to rescind the contract entered into according to the
preceding paragraph, I agree that I will forfeit to the Company the amount I have paid
which is to reimburse them for the use and wear of the merchandise and I hereby
authorize and empower the Company or its Representatives to enter the premises
wherever the merchandise may be and take and carry the same away even while in my
absence.
5. I agree not to change the location of the merchandise without first receiving written
consent from the Company, and I shall never attempt to assign, pledge, or rent the
merchandise so long as this contract remains in force.
6. If any change in the description of the purchaser or the guarantor occurs, I agree to
report such a change immediately to the Company.
7. If the merchandise is damaged or destroyed because of fire, theft, loss, etc., before
the full payment of the price, I agree to pay all the rest of the price immediately upon
your request.
8. In the event of an application being made by a third party for attachment, provi-
sional attachment, etc., against the said merchandise, I agree that I will try to prove
your ownership to the merchandise, using my best efforts to show the necessary facts.
I also agree that I will report the event immediately to you.
9. 1 agree to make competent the law court having jurisdiction over the location of
* The Installment Sales Law applies to transactions of this type. See the text accompanying
notes 177, 178 supra.
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the ................................................................................ Office of the Company in conducting any
litigation or lawsuit relating to the stipulations contained in this contract
Name and Address: ................................................ Date
Signature: ..................................................................
I hereby jointly and severally guarantee with the principal party the due perform-
ance of this contract.
FoR GUARANTOR Name and Address: ................................................ Date
Signature: ..................................................................
RECEIPT OF THE MERCHANDISE
To TE -------------------- CoMPANY, LTD.
Description of merchandise:
Type: ............................ Set N o.: ................................ Q uantity : ..................................
Sale Price: ......... Yen (f........... )
This is to certify that the above-mentioned merchandise has been placed in my
custody. I agree to return the same merchandise will be returned at any time on your
request.
N am e and Address: ......................................................
Signature: ........................................................................
Date
